March 1969

EDITORIAL REPRINT

The Spirit of Change

ALEXANDER F. SKUTCH

Every Child's Birthright

H. J. J. WINTER

What Is the Philosophy of Science?

R. N. KAK

"Emptiness" and the Other Doors to Deliverance

DOROTHY HEWLETT

On Christina Rossetti

BOOKS REVIEWED INCLUDE

Edward Conze's *Thirty Years of Buddhist Studies*; Aziz Ahmad's *Islamic Modernism in India and Pakistan 1857–1964*; *Chinese Mythology*; *Russian Themes*; *A History of Neo-African Literature*

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THE ARYAN PATH

VOLUME XL - NO. 3

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Editor:
SOPHIA WADIA

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THE ARYAN PATH

Point out the "Way" — however dimly, and lost among the host — as does the evening star to those who tread their path in darkness.

— The Voice of the Silence

VOL. XL MARCH 1969 No. 3

The Spirit of Change

[We reprint this Editorial from THE ARYAN PATH, April 1940.—ED.]

"Of seasons I am the Spring, called Kusumākara."
—Krishna in the *Bhagavad-Gita*

DURING the last month, coincident with Nature's festival, the Spring Equinox, the orthodox among the Christians have observed Easter, the Hindus their Maha Shiva Ratri, and the Parsis their Jamshed-i-Navroz, which last is also celebrated every year in Iran with traditional pomp and splendour. Hindu mythology gives clues to the intimate relation which subsists between the macro- and the microcosm. The invisible part of the universe and the invisible aspect of man are shown to be as closely knit as is man's body with the earth he stands on, the air that he breathes, and the distant stars which he beholds. Again between the invisible and the visible of both the cosmoses there is intimacy; and so the seasonal changes which show themselves in outward beauty are described as reflections and shadows of the psychical processes — the unfelt throbs within the crust of the earth and the currents which circulate within the atmosphere which surrounds it.

The spring to which people look forward in winter symbolizes in their minds not mere change, but a change with a very definite promise. The vision of a blessed state is conjured up — "they lived in peace and prosperity ever after." Hope springs always in human consciousness, but the atmosphere of beauty and triumph which the spring expresses is most conducive to the birth of high hopes. But men's hopes are vague and they do not know what that promise of spring really means. It requires a poet to focus such hopes in definiteness and a sage to show the steps that lead to their realization. Strange as it may appear at first sight, the austere Shiva, Patron-Saint of Yogis and Sannyasis, is made in Hindu mythology

to play more than one important part related to the season of spring. The Great Ascetic reduced to ashes Kāma-Deva, the God of Love, when the latter tried to awaken love in Shiva, plunged in meditation. It is said that when spring was working its magic in trees and among bees and birds, and all humans were under its spell, the only being who remained uninfluenced was Shiva, who continued his meditation unmoved. Then Kāma-Deva tried to impress Mahādeva to wake to love and met with his own death. From the Third Eye of Shiva darted forth fire which reduced Kāma-Deva to ashes. The immortal Kālidāsa who created his *Kumārasambhava* out of this old myth has also written some lines which intimate the magic of spiritual change in the spring. In his *Ṛtusaṁhāra*, in which he sings of the six seasons and which has been called "a Lover's Calendar," he deals with spring not first but last — a point of debate among writers on poetics; Dr. A. Berriedale Keith, however, strikes the correct note when he comments:

> But spring brings to them and to all nature new life and joy; we see now why the poet begins with summer; it enables him to end with the season in which young love, in harmony with the birth of a new year, is made perfect.

Not only that, Kālidāsa also seems to remember the spiritual counterpart of the season which affects the ascetic as the beauty of spring affects the human lover and the aesthete. Spring tests the resolutions of the ascetic who keeps his emotions under control as it stirs the love slumbering in inexperienced youth. Of this Kālidāsa sings — as beautifully rendered in English by Arthur W. Ryder, whose death lovers of the East will continue to mourn:

The days are soft, the evenings clear
And charming; everything
That moves and lives and blossoms, dear,
Is sweeter in the Spring.
The groves are beautifully bright
For many and many a mile
With jasmine flowers that are as white
As loving woman's smile:
The resolution of a saint
Might well be tried by this;
Far more, young hearts that fancies paint
With dreams of loving bliss.

In the interior life of man psychical seasons produce their influence. In the man who is integrating himself, a new Love is born from which the duality of human emotion is eliminated; then from the muddy pool

of passion the lotus of compassion rises heavenward; finally Divine Love focused within himself is poured out in benediction for all.

In varying degrees the transmutation of human love into divine compassion is taking place; that benign work of silent Nature is marred by man's indulgence and spoiled by man's folly. Hedonism degrades love to lust; rigid asceticism murders love and the ascetic is obsessed by the ghost left behind. The seminal principle in Nature as in man acts as the channel for the Soul's manifestation, providing for it a form. When man co-operates with Nature in activating that principle the result is rhythm, harmony, beauty; Nature, frustrated by man through blind ignorance or deliberate sin, ever tries to restore the broken order. A continuous struggle is going on between restoring Nature and marring man and because of that we see the spirit of change at work. Nature labours to create humanity after a divine pattern; man, a prey to his own selfishness, regards the power of nurture as superior to Nature, which he endeavours to mould, and the result — every time he finds Nature stronger than himself. However often he overcomes his own error, the result of his own jejune efforts at improving Nature, he never succeeds in conquering her. Nature is conquered by obeisance to her laws — never otherwise.

In every nation there are men and women who want to change outer conditions, and there are those, fewer in number, who endeavour to transmute their own attitude and disposition. Most of them fail because they do not possess the knowledge necessary for that purpose. That knowledge pertains to the spiritual stratum of the universe, wherein wisdom is compassion and justice is mercy and sacrifice is duty. Learned Pandits of the world seek after Wisdom, try to establish Justice, preach the Path of Duty — without taking into account the emotional counterparts of these. Religious-hearted men of the world preach and try to practise compassion and mercy and sacrifice without recognizing the value of their mental counterparts. A learned head and a hard heart are as evil a combination as a sentimental heart which tries to do or to be good without a knowledge of what is good to do.

The present disintegrated state of the educated man is the direct result of materialistic philosophy, the child of modern science, which values senses and sense-data most highly, and of the crude theology which separates human life on earth from the heavenly life of the saved and the hellish life of the damned. "God 's in his heaven — all 's right with the world!" does not make for a right philosophy but only strengthens the division between the sacred and the secular. Modern knowledge regards emotions as born of the flesh, Soul as the product of the sensorium. Ancient knowledge looks upon the Soul, the Divine Thinker, as the builder of the tabernacle — the primary cause and not the product of the body.

Also, it regards the basic human desire, the Will-to-Live, called *Tanha* or *Trishna*, as a reflection from Divine Desire; this *Tanha*, however, through contact with the elemental yet sentient psychic forces known as Nature Spirits, becomes separative and competitive in expression, whereas Divine Desire is wholly altruistic — Compassion Absolute. Thus, lust, wrath, greed, and their like are not the progeny of the body of flesh. Their father is this *Tanha* and their mother the Nature Spirits — salamanders, sylphs, undines, gnomes, which are not self-conscious intelligences but may be accurately described as the forces of subtle nature. These human desires play an important part in the creating of the body, in its preservation, and in its death. Wrong asceticism controls the senses only; the right type of asceticism purifies the desire-nature; and in right asceticism the human Soul, the Thinker, is the controller of the wandering mind as well as the purifier of the manifold desires.

The Spirit of Change engendered by the Soul assisted by Nature will continue to work till the day when man will have unfolded his divinity. Then Man, the great Purusa, having become the lord and master of Nature, the fecund Prakriti, will enjoy Eternal Spring.

Pause for a moment and consider what it is we in truth desire, of what we are in search. Nothing else, surely, than a reconciliation between ourselves and the world to which we belong, that is — may we not say? — an attunement or concord between Being and Becoming, which if attainable were pure felicity, a reconciliation of harmony which human wisdom and experience fail in the world they so anxiously contemplate either to perceive or to effect. Yet since in the arts they are in a manner found together, in essence one, for this reason human nature derives from the arts its deepest satisfactions. Poetry appears to be something we have always known in our hearts, but have never before had so vividly presented to us. In these arts of divination the waking consults the dreaming mind; the surface consciousness, in search of more favourable omens, inquires of the oracle, of the better informed and wiser soul. And the inspired priestess by whom the world is seen in the wider perspective answers, "Your experience is real, but consult the god within you and know that this real is not the whole of reality."

—W. MACNEILE DIXON

ALEXANDER F. SKUTCH

Every Child's Birthright

[We are glad to have another contribution from our esteemed friend, Dr. Alexander F. Skutch. As usual, his writing expresses with sincere feeling many valuable and positive insights. His basic theme is what he calls, in a beautiful phrase, "the altruism of parenthood." His comments on irresponsible parenthood, from this standpoint, are withering. We hope many readers will feel the positive moral force of his ironic hope that those who do not feel the altruistic leaning to parenthood will remain childless.

We are wholly in sympathy with his feeling about every child's birthright. We can only hope, however, that more and more people will come to share the ancient traditional feeling, reinforced by the Theosophical Movement and by Gandhiji, that an equal reverence is due to sex regarded as a creative power. This rules out all methods of birth-control except abstinence.—ED.]

IT IS ONE OF MANKIND'S GREATEST TRAGEDIES that human beings can be brought into the world with less careful preparation than many other members of the animal kingdom must make to bring forth their young. Birds, for example — robins and sparrows and thousands of other kinds — cannot hatch their chicks without first acquiring a territory that contains a nest site and adequate sources of food, and building a nest, and patiently warming their eggs for weeks or even months. With such a system of reproduction, casual or careless parenthood, such as occurs with lamentable frequency among men, is an impossibility.

In many other animals that reproduce by means of eggs, including certain fishes and frogs and insects such as bees, ants, and wasps, similar preparations must be made, and care bestowed, before the young emerge from the egg, which corresponds to birth among mammals. The mammalian system of reproduction provides for the embryo developing within the mother's body the safest and most constantly favourable environment, at the same time that it relieves the parent of the need to care actively for her unborn progeny, of whose presence within her she may long remain unaware. To bring forth her young alive, all she need do is to eat well and preserve her own life. Among mammals, the altruism of parenthood hardly appears in the prenatal stage. How different from the situation in birds and wasps and bees!

In many non-human mammals, casual reproduction is checked by the restriction of sexual activity to certain periods of the year, when it will result in the birth of the young in the season most favourable for their nurture, as in spring or early summer in the temperate zones. Moreover,

the elaborate innate courtship rituals which in some species must precede the union of the sexes prevent haphazard insemination. Man, like his domestic animals, has lost the seasonal rhythm of reproduction along with an innate courtship pattern. Is it not paradoxical that the creature which regards itself as the highest member of the animal kingdom, and in some respects actually is, can be born more casually than almost any other warm-blooded animal? In most undertakings, the worth of the product is proportionate to the care which enters into its production. It is often maintained that a human being is of infinite worth; yet untold millions are started on life's path with less forethought than goes into the preparation of a cup of tea!

There are reasons for regretting that we are not hatched from eggs nursed into life by the heat of the parent's body, perhaps by the prospective father and mother taking turns at incubation, as in innumerable kinds of birds. Then only wives and husbands who had a modicum of the virtue of patience, who could co-operate together, who desired babies strongly enough to sit still for them — only such men and women could become parents. And while quietly incubating their eggs, they might meditate, and perhaps hatch out some worth-while thoughts along with their infants!

We mammals cannot by willing it revert to a method of reproduction that was probably followed by our remote ancestors of past geologic ages. But we can resolve that no unwanted baby shall ever be born, and by deliberate effort come at least close to the realization of this ideal. Mankind may or may not be a cosmic accident, but it is pathetic that any individual man or woman should ever be a human accident. If there is any truth in all that we hear these days about the intrinsic dignity of every human being, this dignity must pertain to him from the beginning; and it is difficult to recognize dignity in an accident. The unwanted child seems to have been subtly insulted before ever he was born. Even if, born in wedlock, he escape the social stigma of illegitimacy, he enters the world with a handicap; for he is not welcomed with the eager love which will give him the best start in life.

Margaret Sanger fought for birth-control primarily to emancipate women from the burden of bearing and rearing children they did not want, and now its importance in holding the human population of this planet within reasonable limits is gaining wide recognition. But, above all, we must consider the new life that is about to enter the world. It should come as an invited guest whom we deem it an honour to serve, not as an unwelcome intruder whose arrival we resent.

The best-endowed of parents cannot guarantee that their children will be sound in body, or beautiful, or outstandingly intelligent, or that they

will all their lives escape every one of the countless ills that continue to afflict humanity. But the parent of a child who is not wanted, who is not lovingly anticipated from the beginning, has made a tragic mistake. The very least that every child has a right to demand of those who begot him is that he was conceived because he was desired. To be wanted is the minimum birthright of every human being. The unwanted baby is cheated of his birthright before he is born.

It is not enough that parents should desire children as warm little bodies to be fondled and caressed, or as assets to their social status. I know mothers in the humbler ranks of society who welcome their baby as a creature to be decked out in all the poor finery they can afford and paraded about as a sort of animated doll; but their affection wanes as the growing child develops personality and independence. They neglect, if they do not actually abuse, the boy or girl who has become able to perform useful chores for them, to lavish all their love on the latest arrival.

Those who desire children should desire children of a certain quality; they should have an ideal for them. To specify in advance what our children should be is a practice not without danger. It is a great mistake for expectant parents to set their hearts upon having a boy — or a girl — for they are as likely to be disappointed as to be satisfied. Such disappointment may subtly affect the parents' relations with a child of the undesired sex. He is all too likely to discover, before he is grown, that he unwillingly vexed his parents by entering the world with the wrong sex, and such knowledge will hardly strengthen the bonds of affection between child and parent. Although it is natural for a parent who has won distinction in some art or profession, who is perhaps the inheritor of a long tradition of achievement in some particular field, to wish his child to follow in the same path, to insist upon this would be unwise. By temperament and talent, the child may be far better fitted for some other undertaking.

One's ideal for his children, then, must not specify details such as sex and occupation but be of a more general nature. Without great risk of frustration and disappointment, and making unfair demands upon the child, one can hold for him only an ideal of universal validity. The only qualities that we can justly require of a child are those which have been widely approved by the long experience of mankind. To have his child become a man or woman who is loving, generous, compassionate, responsible, self-controlled, temperate, and cheerful — this is an ideal which every parent can fairly hold. These are the qualities that make us lovable: above all, parents should desire a child who inspires their love, which alone can transform into pleasures the heavy sacrifices they must make for his nurture and education. The subject of prenatal influences, which so interested Oliver Wendell Holmes, seems never to have been thoroughly

explored. But it does not appear unreasonable to suppose that the persistently held hopes and ideals of an expectant mother can favourably affect the quality of the child she bears in her womb and nourishes with her blood; just as, it was once widely believed, the unborn child might be harmed in body or mind by some disturbing experience of the mother.

An objection sometimes raised against the wide dissemination of knowledge of birth-control is that it enables people to indulge as freely as they wish in amatory pleasures, without paying the price in consequent parental obligations. On the contrary, I believe that nothing is more greatly to be desired than that people who wish to indulge their passions without begetting children remain for ever childless. If this result could be ensured, not only would the current population explosion be alleviated, but the quality of the human race would improve. Although environment strongly affects the formation of temperament and character, the hereditary factor cannot be ignored. Children born to unwilling parents are, in later years, more likely to resent the duties of parenthood than are children whose parents desired them. The easier the avoidance of parenthood is made, the more the strain of people too selfish or unloving to desire children should dwindle, if it does not wholly disappear from the earth; the more, too, the generous, loving people, who alone make good parents and raise children like themselves, will come to predominate. So let those married couples who wish to indulge their reproductive impulses without the natural consequences thereof do so as much as they like. They will pay for their selfish sensuality by having neither children nor grandchildren to brighten their declining years. Their names and their breed will disappear from the earth, which will be better without them.

Probably the greatest single forward step that mankind could make would be the elimination of careless, irresponsible parenthood. Until this is achieved, humanity can hardly be said to have come of age and be master of its destiny. Our vaunted ability to control nuclear reactions and the courses of spaceships will avail us little if we fail to control something of far more fundamental importance, our own abundance, upon which the solution of all stubborn social and political problems and our very adjustment to the earth which supports us ultimately depend. How many people the earth can support, without undue sacrifice of the values that make life precious, is a problem that will require all the wisdom of scientists and statesmen to solve. And nobody who cares about the future of mankind and the earth that supports it will wish to incur responsibility for a birth-rate that is threatening both with disaster.

Yet to leave some progeny to replace himself seems to be not only the right but the obligation of every person who regards life in the human

form as a priceless gift. Whether or not one wants children and is capable of lavishing upon them the loving care indispensable for their spiritual no less than their bodily growth, is a question which every man and woman must decide for himself or herself. The kinder life has been to him and the happier he is, the more eager will the generous person be to give life to others. That one who finds existence a painful burden should refrain from bringing others into what he regards as a cruel and evil world, is an attitude with which we can sympathize. But those healthy people, avid for life, who avoid parenthood because it will interfere with their pleasures arouse our pity or contempt. They forget that they are living joyously because others made sacrifices for them; and that since we cannot really repay what we owe to loving parents, we must pass on the debt to loved children. Nevertheless, if these carefree people do not feel within themselves the stirrings of parental love, if they do not believe that their lives will be enriched by the experience of parenthood, it is better that they die morally insolvent. For only those who desire and lovingly anticipate their babies give them their birthright.

ALEXANDER F. SKUTCH

After Reading *The Voice of the Silence* in Sicily

And can the Wheel of Thought not cease to turn?
The Sun's great golden Wheel may never rest,
Though sinking seawards yonder in the west,
Where Etna's answering fires for ever burn.

"The Wheel of the Good Law moves swiftly on";
The hand of Karma guides it as it rolls,
And bound to it are all earth's pilgrim souls —
So says the ancient book whose page I con.

O mighty servants of great BRAHMAN's will,
Untiring Sun, and universal Law,
Your perfect yoga fills my heart with awe,
For ever acting, yet for ever still.

Such action is repose. But I must learn
How one small wheel can be completely stayed,
For only so shall BRAHMAN be obeyed . . .
O that the Wheel of Thought might cease to turn!

J. N. B.

H. J. J. WINTER

What Is the Philosophy of Science?

[Dr. H. J. J. Winter, M.SC., PH.D., D.SC. (London), is Senior Lecturer at the Science Education Centre, University of Exeter, Devon, and well known as the author of *Western Science* (Wisdom of the East Series, 1952), *The History of Scientific Thought with Special Reference to Asia*, and *The Life and Thought of Avicenna*, besides numerous research papers in international journals. We are glad to have his compact and thoughtful consideration of the philosophy of science — both as to method and as to conclusions which have become incorporated in modern philosophical thought. —ED.]

SOME TWENTY YEARS AGO, as a young University lecturer, I was asked by my professor, a much respected scholar and a man of wide sympathies, what I meant by the philosophy of science. Reared in the school of Wundt and conversant with Continental views on philosophy, he saw it as a totality which embraced all man's thoughts and feelings. Why then a special "philosophy" for science? I cannot now remember my exact reply, but it was to the effect that here was a materialist philosophy dealing with those fundamental entities of particular concern to scientists, namely, space and time, matter and energy, and so on. Naturally he was not impressed, the question was dropped, and with the arrogance of youth I dismissed it from my mind. But since then the philosophy of science has drawn many adherents and has grown into a respectable academic discipline. Not that it is a new subject: the pioneer historian and philosopher of science, William Whewell, Master of Trinity College, Cambridge, made a significant contribution[1] to it around the middle of the nineteenth century, whilst the later writings of Ernst Mach[2] and Henri Poincaré[3] are well known. The original question, however, still remains — What *is* the philosophy of science? — and moreover, do we need such a philosophy of science? Let us examine the problem further.

It has become fashionable to talk about the philosophy of science, for it is associated with a luxuriant growth of the pseudo-sciences so replete with new jargon that, lest we fall into a labyrinth of medieval alchemy, we are drawn into a study of semantics. Scientific method is being ap-

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[1] W. Whewell. *Philosophy of the Inductive Sciences*, 2 vols London, 1840.

[2] E. Mach. *Die Mechanik in ihrer Ertwicklung*. Leipzig, 1883. *The Science of Mechanics*. Chicago, 1902.

[3] H. Poincaré. *La Science et l'Hypothése*. Paris, 1908. *La valeur de la science*. Paris 1909. *Science et Méthode*. Paris, 1909.

G. B. Halsted. English translation of above in one volume. New York, 1913. (Also available in Dover Publications' paperbacks).

plied in disciplines not traditionally regarded as scientific and its results received with an optimism which is sometimes misplaced. The tools of science require a long apprenticeship and are not to be rashly used. What is more important, however, from our immediate point of view, is the parallel growth of combinations and applications of the exact sciences in association with medicine, psychology, biochemistry, and space research which call forth new and genuine inductive methods of enquiry which surpass those of Whewell, J. S. Mill,[4] Galton,[5] Karl Pearson,[6] and even R. A. Fisher.[7] It is now necessary to examine critically the new statistical methods and to understand to what extent induction implies causation in particular cases; in fact, we are not in the realm of truth but only in probability, correlation, and relevance.

Scientific theories are needed to co-ordinate experimental findings into a consistent whole, a kind of unity in diversity, capable not only of summarizing the past and present, but also of predicting the future. By analogy, these theories may influence the methods of investigation to be used in sciences other than the science in which such theories originated, and indeed may create whole new disciplines from which further knowledge, wholly unexpected and strikingly fresh, may accrue. One has only to recall Darwin's theory of evolution and how, removed from their original context, two new inductive methods, the evolutionary and the comparative, opened up entirely virgin fields quite outside biology.[8] When, however, we examine the basic concepts or terms in which scientific knowledge is expressed we find that we are using the same terms as the philosopher: ultimately we have to consider how best with our limited human faculties to interpret time, space, atomicity, the wave-particle dualism, quantization, and a number of other fundamental entities and concepts. In doing this we need not step into the province of the philosopher or theologian who may wish to speak of God or invoke a Supreme Intelligence; we merely take the external world as it is and investigate it as objectively as we can. Inevitably we reveal here a limitation of science, the preoccupation with a transient world of phenomena to the exclusion of the Absolute. But even in this inductive process, when the most elegant form of our theories, particularly at the subsequent deductive stage where mathematics may be required, has to be worked out, then problems of aesthetics arise. Clumsy notations obscure discoveries;

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[4] J. S. Mill. *A System of Logic.* London, 1843.

[5] F. Galton. *Hereditary Genius: An Inquiry into its Laws and Consequences.* London, 1869. (Fontana Books, 1962).

[6] K Pearson. *The Grammar of Science.* London, 1892.

[7] R. A. Fisher. *Statistical Methods for Research Workers.* Edinburgh, 1925. *The Design of Experiments.* Edinburgh, 1935. *e.g.* Comparative Philology, Comparative Religion.

[8] F. Max Müller (editor). *The Sacred Books of the East.* 50 volumes, Oxford, 1876–1910.

clear and economical ones facilitate them. Successful scientists and mathematicians have something of the artist in them in that they are faced with creative situations. It was said of Einstein that when making an appraisal of his own equations he would ask himself whether God in his perfection would have approved of their appearance or rejected them as inelegant. This criterion of excellence applies to all the various models that scientists make when trying to understand natural processes, whether these models be mental, or actual working machines, since both have a mental origin.

Now traditional philosophy or metaphysics is concerned with truth, beauty, and goodness, and on the one hand impinges upon religion and on the other hand is concerned to know what the findings of science are. Whilst the experimental scientist can pursue quite happily much of his work within the confines of his own particular scientific discipline, the philosopher is compelled nowadays to make sure that his broader generalizations are supported by scientific evidence. It is, however, desirable that the scientist also should know something of the impact of his discoveries upon philosophy, because philosophy is intimately involved with some of his most cherished concepts. Though many working scientists do not concern themselves directly with these concepts, they have to admit upon interrogation that, for instance, matter, space, time, force, the relativity of events, and causality are equally the concern of the philosopher. So it is that a philosophy which relates to (*a*) this common ground and (*b*) to the phenomena which form the special study of the sciences has evolved into what is now known as the philosophy of science. It is part of philosophy in the broadest sense and must answer to it, whilst at the same time, like the philosophy of art or the philosophy of history, it has specific regions of investigation which are peculiarly its own.

Thus, as well as the nature of scientific knowledge, there are the inductive-deductive methods by which this knowledge is obtained. Methods of discovery interest most thoughtful people. Human factors are as far as possible eliminated during the process of experiment, but in the ensuing interpretation of data there is often considerable scope in the formulation of hypotheses, and it is ultimately a case of choosing the explanation which best accords with the experimental facts at the time. The history of science affords notable instances of rival hypotheses, some of which have hardened into theories, such as the wave and corpuscular theories of the nature of light.[9] In the handling of vast provinces of scientific knowledge comprehensive generalizations are needed to co-ordinate the facts relating to many apparently diverse phenomena, and the ability to

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[9] Cortes Pla. *El Enigma de la Luz*. Buenos Aires, 1949.

create such powerful generalizations, capable of prediction of events in the future, is given to few men, their lives separated sometimes by hundreds of years of human history. The names of Newton and Darwin immediately spring to mind. We ascribe their success to intuition, or to genius, but we cannot order it, and humanity must await their coming for the next great leap forward.

Newton's simple words to the effect that he was like a boy picking up pebbles on the sea-shore and had sometimes examined stones brighter than the rest, and that he had merely stood upon the shoulders of his predecessors and contemporaries, do not reveal any secrets. What is, however, clear, is that scientific knowledge is cumulative, the inductive methods are able to generate new knowledge, and experiment and theory *together* take us further into the unknown. No such mechanism for advancement is to be found, for example, in art or in music. We must judge science by its results, which usually appear to the layman in the form of technology, even though we only partly understand its process of discovery. It is the task of the philosopher of science to study this mechanism of discovery and the nature of the scientific knowledge to which it gives rise.

So far we have concerned ourselves with knowledge obtained through experiment and theory. In medieval times, when scientific experiments were seldom performed, this was known as knowledge obtained by reason, in contrast with knowledge obtained by revelation, or enlightenment through the direct intervention of God. The Middle Ages together formed an age of belief when all the seven secular "sciences" — the *trivium* (grammar, logic, and rhetoric) and the *quadrivium* (arithmetic, astronomy, geometry, and music) — were subordinate to the eighth, the queen of the sciences, or theology. Medieval Islam in this context knew secular knowledge as *'ilm*, divine knowledge as *ma'rifa*. Such a picture of the sources of human knowledge reveals a further limitation of science, namely that it depends initially on impressions of the external world received through the sense organs. Newton wrote of first or ultimate, and second or penultimate causes; the first were of God and were no concern of science; the second involved the investigation of *how* the universe behaved and were, therefore, the very province of science. Since first causes were concerned with *why* the universe behaves in such and such a manner, and not in other ways, they are the essence of philosophy and religion, outside the realm of scientific experiment. To Newton science and religion were separated by a clear-cut division and derived from two distinct and different epistemologies.

Inevitably, the philosopher of science will welcome the help of the psychologist in trying to understand how, from experimental "facts," the

raw material of the external world, the edifice of scientific laws is built up in the mind, and indeed how best to facilitate this process, to stimulate creativity. From birth onwards impressions from the external world flood in upon the child, and in his early years the first mental "framework" of ideas relating to extension and volume is established. Piaget[10] has shown experimentally when these and other basic concepts, such as that of physical causality, are initially crystallized. Throughout life, as the result of our manifold experiences of people and events, we augment and modify these early frameworks, so that in our maturity we hope to have attained some totality of vision, a philosophy, perhaps wisdom. This may be enriched by religion if the individual is responsive to influences which do not derive directly from the immediate physical world of phenomena.

It would be pretentious to attempt a definition of intuition here, but we may with advantage recall that Henri Bergson[11] thought of it as a power of genius in seeing more than normal mortals can see, a further penetration into a subject of study; and though the genius may fall short of his ideal of perfection, he adds thereby to the sum of human achievement by one indivisible, direct, and individual revelation. Bergson's philosophy is also important in that it incorporates the findings of the biological sciences in a new vision of creative evolution, of which "the whole aim is to enhance the value of science by showing its true place and function in the greater reality of life."[12] This process has been further exploited by the remarkable synthesis[13] made by Professor S. Alexander in his Gifford Lectures of 1916–18. Briefly, his thesis was to the effect that out of the space-time of relativity there emerged the basic stuff of the universe, namely, matter; this non-living matter gave birth to living things; in the evolution of living things there appeared in due course mind; and from mind came the evolution of the concept of God: God being indeed the end and not the beginning, ultimate rather than the instrument of order in primeval chaos. There is, however, no denial of God in nature in the present; the mind is coming to reveal God. It would be exciting to examine in its various aspects this philosophy of evolution and anticipation, and to relate it to developments in science in the last half-century, but we have already said enough to emphasize the importance of science within philosophy. As for the professor and myself

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[10] J. Piaget. *The Child's Conception of the World*. London, 1929. *The Child's Conception of Physical Causality*. London, 1930.

J. Piaget, B. Inhelder and A. Szeminska. *The Child's Conception of Geometry*. London, 1960.

[11] Henri Bergson *L'évolution Créatrice*. Paris, 1907.

[12] H. Wildon Carr. *Henry Bergson: The Philosophy of Change*. London, 1911. (p. vii).

[13] S. Alexander. *Space, Time and Deity*, 2 volumes, London, 1920. (New edition with foreword by Professor Dorothy Emmet. London, 1966).

and our conversation of twenty years ago we were both right in the sense that we were stressing the two aspects of the one problem. A. J. Balfour,[14] in his significant work of 1879, postulated that the universe is extended, enduring, changing, and regularly changing, independently of us human beings with it. Despite the fact that we are now able, as a result of science and technology, to modify our environment, that is, to influence the universe in a very limited way, our definition of the philosophy of science is just an elaboration of what Balfour had in mind. To him the philosophy of science would have been the study of mechanism and process in the external world, in what the medieval scholar knew as the macrocosm. Our definition must now, assuredly, include also the microcosm, man himself. From now on, the philosopher of science must study not only mechanism and process in the so-called external world but also mechanism and process in the human mind.[15]

H. J. J. WINTER

Black Swan

Mystery embodied,
You glide
With patrician grace;
Smooth water
Ruffled in your wake
Seems pondering your enigma;
And noonday
Challenged by black satin night
Blinks in surprise.

HERBERT BLUEN

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[14] A. J. Balfour. *In Defence of Philosophic Doubt.* London 1879. *The Foundations of Belief.* London, 1895.

[15] W. Grey Walter. *The Living Brain.* London, 1953.

Further reading :

K. R. Popper. *The Logic of Scientific Discovery.* London, 1959.

P. B. Medawar. *The Art of the Soluble.* London, 1967.

P. Teilhard de Chardin. *Le Phénomène Humain.* Paris, 1955. *The Phenomenon of Man.* London and New York, 1959.

R. N. KAK

"Emptiness" and the Other Doors to Deliverance

[Readers will remember Shri R. N. Kak for his several contributions on aspects of Buddhist teaching in our pages. In this interesting article he collates from Buddhist texts the various aspects of what are known as "The Three Doors to Deliverance." His chief emphasis is on "Emptiness" or *Śūnyatā*. He deals also with the two other concepts of *Animitta* and *Apraṇihita*. The psychological approach of these teachings has a definite practical orientation.—ED.]

WHEN one arrives at the "Path," progress towards Nirvāṇa is then made through the three "doors to deliverance." As taught in the Sūtras these are (1) Emptiness (*Śūnyatā*), the Signless (*Ānimitta*) and the Wishless (*Apraṇihita*).[1] Buddhist philosophizing has been very much influenced by the first two members of this triad.

The best-known is "Emptiness." The Sthaviras used it sparsely. On occasion it may seem that the term "Emptiness" indicates Mahāyāna influence more than the old tradition. The central tenet of the Sthaviras and old traditional schools was impermanence and not emptiness. Among the old schools there was some resistance to just those sayings of the Tathāgata which were "profound, deep in meaning, supramundane, connected with the Void."[2] It is possible that in this respect the Mahāyāna preserved the original teaching more faithfully than the Sthaviras.

Emptiness means the absence of something. Because of the Abhidharma stress on the *anatta* doctrine it is defined as that which is "devoid of a self, or of anything belonging, or pertaining, to a self (*attanīya*)."[3] The profound spirituality behind this teaching should not be underestimated. If we empty ourselves of everything that does not pertain to self, finally the very notion of a self is given up. Here emptiness is identified with the third mark of "not-self." Emptiness has been divided and sub-divided by the Buddhists for the purposes of meditational practices. The *Visuddhimagga* shows how it should be understood in two, four, six, eight, ten, twelve, and forty-two ways.

This idea of equating Emptiness with not-self is not always present. In the *Paṭisambhidāmagga* emptiness means "devoid of self" in only four cases. In other cases it just means "absent from," "nullified," and, at times, even the Path and Nirvāṇa. The "emptiness section" of the *Dhammasaṅgaṇi* propounds the principle that any psychic state is simply a conglomeration of certain impersonal *dharmas* which soon breaks up.

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[1] *Dīgha-Nikāya*, III.219

[2] *Aṅguttara Nikāya*, I. 72; *Saṁyutta-Nikāya*, II. 267

[3] *Majjhima-Nikāya*, I.297; II.263; *Saṁyutta-Nikāya*, IV.54

In applying the word *śūnya* to worldly things, Bodhidharma has said, "All things are empty, and there is nothing desirable or to be sought after." All things are unsubstantial and unsatisfactory and therefore empty. The word "empty" is also used in devaluing the things of this world. We find this in the comparison of the inner sense-fields with an empty, deserted, and uninhabited village[4] and also when emptiness means "devoid of reality"[5] or "useless" or "worthless."[6] Because the world is produced by many interconnected causes everything in it is empty. This connection with conditioned co-production was stressed less in early Buddhism than in the Mādhyamika system. In *Lalitavistara* it is said:

> Well have I comprehended the world's voidness, which is due to its being produced from interconnected causes. It vanishes in the twinkling of an eye, and is like unto a mirage or a city of the Gandharvas.

Buddhaghoṣa also attributes emptiness of a personality (*attabhāva*, selfhood) to each and every link of conditioned co-production and states that their existence is dependent on conditions.[7]

Emptiness designates both deprivation and fulfilment. In the first sense it refers to the negative qualities like transitoriness, impermanence, etc., of the world and worldly things. In the sense of fulfilment it means the result of negating these negative qualities. The adjective *śūnya* refers to worldly things and means "found wanting." St. John of the Cross has also said:

> The soul is conscious of a profound emptiness in itself, a cruel destitution of the three kinds of goods, natural, temporal and spiritual, which are ordained for its comfort. It sees itself in the midst of the opposite evils, miserable imperfections, dryness and emptiness of understanding, and abandonment of the spirit in darkness.

The noun *śūnyatā* lays stress on the negation of this world and means inward "freedom." In a sense it becomes a name for *Nirvāṇa*, which lacks greed, hate, and delusion. It becomes one of the doors to deliverance. For the purpose of realizing a "surpassingly pure and unsurpassable emptiness" two Suttas[8] teach a method of emptying the mind of all particular ideas. An exalted kind of emptiness is experienced in the state of the third formless trance at the stage of "nothing whatever." When all processes are seen to be empty, one is said to "plunge into the Void," which is regarded as the "posture of the Arhats." "The entrance into the empti-

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[4] *Saṁyutta-Nikāya*, IV.173-4
[5] *Majjhima-Nikāya*, I.145; *Saṁyutta-Nikāya*, III.167, IV.54
[6] *Majjhima-Nikāya*, I.683
[7] *Visuddhimagga*, XVII. 283
[8] *Majjhima-Nikāya*, 121, 122

ness of all dharmas" is called "the seat of the *Tathāgata*."[9] The Buddha is supposed to have abided in this state of emptiness (*Śūnyatatva*) for many thousands of aeons.[10]

It would be a mistake to regard emptiness as merely an intellectual concept, because it has its true connotation in the process of salvation. It can also not be made into a thing and given an ontological meaning. The relative nothing ("this is absent in that") cannot be taken to mean an absolute nothing. It does not mean the non-existence of everything. Emptiness also does not deny all reality and all being. It does not convey the idea of something which is completely indeterminate and purely potential. In China (but only when Buddhism fused with Neo-Taoism) emptiness became the latent potentiality. It was said, in a cosmological sense, that all things go out of emptiness and return to it. Here by the word "emptiness" none of all this is intended. It has also no physical significance like the atomic void, vacuum, or empty space. It is to be considered a purely soteriological term. Its practical basis has always to be kept in view. The moment it is detached from this practical basis it becomes a travesty of itself. In its true Buddhist sense and as a practical term "emptiness" means the complete negation and denial of this world. This is possible by the exercise of wisdom and leads to emancipation from this world. One of the chief purposes of meditation on emptiness is to remove the ignorance which binds us to this world. The various meanings of the term emptiness can be explained only in so far as they appear in the actual process of transcending this world through wisdom.

By "Signless" the Buddhists assert that all perceptions as such should be completely given up as misleading. The origin of this doctrine lies in some of the meditational practices of which the "restraint of the senses" (*indriya-saṁvara*)[11] and the highest trances are the most important. The word "sign" (*nimitta*) occurs in the formula which describes the restraint of the senses. When any object is presented through any one of the six senses, one should "not seize on its *nimitta* or *anuvyañjana*." *Nimitta* is the general appearance and *anuvyañjana* the secondary details. *Indriya*, the word for sense-organ, is derived from *indra* and can be translated as "dominant." It is "a power in us by which we do as we do" and is akin to *dynamis*.[12] It denotes a compelling governing force, a power which according to the Buddhists has to be subdued by us. Entirely by itself a pure sense-perception rarely exists. It is usually embedded in various volitions and drives. The dominance of sense-perception is as much a

[9] *Saddharmapuṇḍarīkasūtra*, X.234

[10] *Lalitavistara*, 414

[11] EDWARD CONZE: *Buddhist Meditation*, 78-83; *Buddhist Scriptures*, 103-5

[12] PLATO: *Republic*, V.477

result of instincts and of the *skandhas* of impulses as a result of the sense-organs themselves.

A stimulus is apprehended at three levels. These three kinds of "sign" correspond to the sign as (*a*) an object of attention, (*b*) a basis for identification or recognition, and (*c*) an occasion for entrancement. The first stage has an active and a passive side. Some impact stimulates the sensibility and on the other hand one is keen and voluntarily turns towards the sense-stimulus. A great deal of importance should be attached to this often neglected second component. According to the *Lankāvatāra* the "eagerness for a multiplicity of objects and their characteristics" is one of the four necessary conditions which enable the consciousness to function on a sensory level. In most cases attention to sense-stimulus is the result of willingness to take notice. It is due to the keenness of the sense-dominant. Rarely is it due to the objective intensity of the stimulation. Restraint of the urge to look and listen produces calm. People who have made some efforts in restraining their urges for sense-experience realize that sense-stimuli disturb rather than satisfy.

Keenness for sense-experience arises from (*a*) the urge of the sense-organ to function, (ii) a desire to make up for the aloneness of the self left to itself, and (iii) a wish to find an outlet for instincts. *Ābhoga,* from *bhuj* (partake of, enjoy), is the term which covers the subjective attitude involved here. It is so much a part of our constitution that it can be completely overcome only at the eighth stage of a Bodhisattva. In *Vinaya,* I. 183, "to seize on a sign" means to seize on something as the object of one's thought to the entire exclusion of everything else. The mind in its natural state is not entranced by anything in particular. The mind loses this naturalness by turning towards the multiplicity of irrelevant entities.

At the second stage recognition follows perception. The object is identified with some habitually perceived and named thing. At *Vinaya,* III.17, to "seize on a sign" is supposed to mean to seize it so keenly that its "mark" is finally recognized. The stimulus is now interpreted as a definite person or thing.

At the third stage emotional and volitional reactions take place. This stage is marked by the perceiver's emotional and volitional adjustments. Had the observation been confined to the first stage only (bare perception of *dharmic* facts) much undesirable thinking would have been stopped at its very source.

The sense-dominant is a power which exerts its effect in various ways: (1) The natural state of the mind in its innate quiescence is disturbed by it. (2) The sense-dominant deflects the mind from the emptiness towards which it turns in its natural purity. It clouds the mind with delusive appearances and thus disturbs the even flow of wisdom. (3) The activities

of the sense-dominant strengthen the unwholesome impulses and instincts. It provides them with a centre of organization and produces disturbance. It is therefore understandable that "when he has left the door of the eye, etc., open" all kinds of unwholesome states "flood" and "pursue and submerge" him.[13]

The building up of sense perceptions is a misuse of the mind. The "restraint of the senses" attempts to stop it at least before the second stage and thus prevents recognition and any emotional or volitional reactions. The mind remains calm in its natural purity.

> He does not seize on its appearance as man or woman, or its appearance as attractive, etc., which makes it into a basis for the defiling passions. . But he stops at what is actually seen.[14]

This is an attempt to disentangle the actual sense-datum from later accretions which are imposed on it by memory, intellect, and imagination. When sensory data are disentangled from emotional and personal associations, they are placed in an emotional void and seen as they are in themselves. Nothing in them seems to be desirable or is sought after. "He seizes only on that which is really there."[15] This is the starting point which in due course of time led to the concept of "Suchness." A thing or a person is taken just as such as it is without any additions or subtractions.

All ascetic religious systems condemn sense desires. Buddhism goes further and regards even sense-perception as harmful. This distrust of sense-objects is not peculiar to Buddhism but is shared for instance by the Platonist tradition, both pagan and Christian. St. Gregory says:

> The soul can by no means recollect itself by itself unless it has first learnt to restrain the phantasms of terrestrial and celestial images from the eye of the mind, unless it has learnt to reject and trample upon whatsoever shall occur to its thinking from corporeal sight, hearing, smelling, tasting and touching; so that it may seek itself, such as it is within, without those things.

Such forces as emotion, will, intellect, mindfulness, and trance are all harnessed to effect a withdrawal from sense-objects. The fourth of the formless trances is the "station of neither perception nor non-perception."

The "Wishless" is comparatively less important for Buddhist thought than Emptiness and the Signless. Literally the word *a-pra-ṇi-hita* means that one "places nothing in front." It shows that one has no hopes, no desires, is aimless, and is not bent on anything. Such a person has already

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[13] CONZE: *Buddhist Meditation*, 80

[14] *Ibid.*, 79

[15] *Ibid.*

rejected any desire for the objects of perception by concentrating on the Signless. Now a question arises whether *Nirvāṇa* can be desired. While a person is at a distance from *Nirvāṇa*, he may desire it and strive for it. So long as he desires, he does not reach *Nirvāṇa*. Once it is attained, all wishing, even for *Nirvāṇa*, will cease.

> There is no grasping with regard to Nirvāṇa. For just as there is no inducement to mosquitoes to alight on a ball of iron which has been heated all day, so these things, by their excessive glory, do not attract the grasp of craving, pride or false opinion.[16]

On the "path" a great deal of effort and striving are needed. With the attainment of *Nirvāṇa* all effort and striving cease because one "has done what had to be done."

Once these three "doors to deliverance" (Emptiness, the Signless, the Wishless) are understood, the higher teaching of Buddhism becomes comparatively easy to follow. Emptiness is the antidote to the "false view of individuality" and rejects all the notions of "I" and "mine." The Signless rejects all objects of senses as illusory and unreal. Wishless is the absence of all desires, intentions, or plans. The *Visuddhimagga* (XXI. 120–7) establishes a correspondence between these three doors and the three marks, "not-self," "ill," and "impermanence." Insight into "not-self" and the rejection of the very idea of "a self, a being and a person" leads to Emptiness. Insight into ill and the realization of finding only suffering in this world results in the Wishless. The Signless is connected with impermanence.

R. N. KAK

> The Master said, "I would prefer not speaking." Tsze-kung said, "If you, Master, do not speak, what shall we, your disciples, have to record?" The Master said, "Does heaven speak? The four seasons pursue their courses, and all things are continually being produced, but does heaven say anything?"
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> —from the *Analects* of CONFUCIUS

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[16] *Dhammasaṅgaṇi*, 254, note 2

JOAN N. BURNETT

Saint Paul the Gnostic

[Mrs. Joan N. Burnett has a background of studies in history and also of a thoughtful study of Theosophy and spiritual teachings generally. Readers will remember her article on "What Do the Dead Sea Scrolls Tell Us?" in our December 1968 issue. She writes of the real significance of Saint Paul's life and teaching in the light of the considerable evidence that he had assimilated and used the mystical tradition of the Gnostics.

We print below the first part of this long essay: the second and concluding part will appear next month.—ED.]

I

IT MIGHT BE CONSIDERED sheer presumption on the part of a woman to venture to write of that St. Paul who reputedly put her entire sex in its place with curt words in the first *Epistle to Timothy*:

> Let the woman learn in silence with all subjection. I suffer not a woman to teach, nor to usurp authority over the man, but to be in silence. [And as grounds for her inferiority there follows the unkind reminder:] For Adam was first formed, then Eve. And Adam was not deceived, but the woman being deceived was in the transgression. (I. Tim. II.11–14)

One might counter this by saying that Adam, if not deceived, was weak-willed, and that Eve showed a praiseworthy sense of values in eating fruit from "a tree to be desired to make one wise" (Genesis III.6). But, without flippancy, it is enough to note that Adam, in the person of many a Church Father of the first centuries of the Christian Era and of many a theologian and commentator since, has been deceived in accepting as Pauline statements and dogmas of which that great Christian Gnostic could never have been guilty.

Of the Pastoral Epistles, from one of which the above quotation comes, the authors of that notable book, *The Riddle of the New Testament*, have this to say: "No modern critic is quite happy in treating these letters as Pauline in their present form. They are filled with words which occur nowhere else in the Pauline epistles."[1] This test of recurring words and characteristic phrases, different styles of writing, contemporary allusions etc., has cleared St. Paul of many charges; e.g., predestination, justification, vicarious atonement, and — happily! — the low status assigned to women and the ban laid on all their potentialities as expositors and teachers within the infant church. Indeed so urgent became the quest for

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[1] SIR EDWARD HOSKYNS and NOEL DAVEY: *The Riddle of the New Testament* (Faber and Faber Ltd., London), p. 203

genuine Paulinism that on 3 November 1963 one of Britain's leading Sunday newspapers, *The Observer,* published an article by the Rev. A. Q. Morton explaining why and how a computer was set to work on the Pauline epistles, resulting in the analysis of more than half-a-million words of Greek prose. (N.B. It is interesting to note that the computer's name was Mercury. Mercury=Hermes=Thoth, the god of Wisdom!) By this means it was shown that of the fourteen epistles only five could have been written by St. Paul, and the implications were described as "deeply challenging." Christian theologians and scholars, declared Mr. Morton, must change their view of St. Paul and revise the history of the early church.

A computer carries weight with modern minds. But in actual fact it found out little that was new. The New Testament itself has always presented inconsistent views of Paul and contradictory statements both by and about him. He was regarded with disfavour by the church's founders, and it was left to Marcion "the heretic" (i.e. Gnostic), to make the first collection of his writings about the year A.D. 140.

Coming thus through Gnostic hands, it was long before these writings were accepted by the church, and then only after much adaptation, at some date in the second century. But despite all the picking and choosing of the New Testament canon when the Early Fathers were shaping their ecclesiastical framework and bending historic hard facts to that end, enough remains — having apparently escaped their notice — to show that there were two divergent groups of Christians, those who followed Peter and worshipped the actual incarnate Jesus, and those who followed Paul and accepted his teaching of the CHRISTOS, or Christ-principle, the cleavage between these two groups being obvious to us from (*a*) the fact that, subsequent to his "conversion" (whatever that inner experience might be), Paul allowed three years to pass before getting in touch with the other apostles at Jerusalem (Galatians I.18), and that on his next visit, *fourteen years later,* he "withstood Peter to the face" (Gal. II.11); and (*b*) the whole trend of his teaching, which almost totally ignored the human Jesus and urged men to seek salvation through their own indwelling Christ-principle — "Christ in you, the hope of glory" (Colossians II.27). Let us not forget that the Epistles have this great "priority value" in the New Testament canon that they are the earliest surviving Christian documents, dating within the first half-century, and therefore show the state of affairs *as it was at the time.* They are far more veracious than the *Acts,* which, as even orthodox theologians confess, give an idealized picture of the church in its early days and would lead us to believe that one simple concordant form of Gospel teaching was accepted from the first.

Nor was it only with the apostles that Paul was at odds. He earned

the hostility of orthodox Jews and of Nazarene Messianists alike, in spite of his impeccable Hebrew descent and his upbringing as a Pharisee. So with whom, then, was he likely to be affiliated, intellectually and spiritually? Surely with the only other thinkers who were in the forefront of the times, that is, the Gnostics. This is negative evidence, it is true; but his writings are full of proofs that he was thoroughly *au fait* with Gnosticism and that it so influenced his views of Jesus that some modern scholars see Pauline Christianity as "neither more nor less than a mystery religion."[2] Even that distinguished churchman (and, incidentally, fine Grecian), the late Very Rev. Dr. W. R. Inge, at one time Dean of St. Paul's Cathedral, London, allowed that "much of St. Paul's theology belongs to the same circle of ideas as the (Greek and Egyptian) Mysteries."[3]

So, even through these few brief references, we see Paul released from the narrow limits of Christian orthodoxy, and if we find Tertullian, in the early part of the third century, calling him scornfully "the Apostle of the heretics," we have only to translate that as "of the Gnostics" and we shall come a great deal nearer to understanding him aright. Paul himself uses the word "heresy" when conducting his defence before the Governor of Jerusalem against a trumped-up charge made by certain "Jews who were of Asia" that he had polluted the temple by bringing non-Jews into it. Paul said the accusation could not be proven; "but this I confess unto thee," he added, "that after the way which they call heresy, so worship I the God of my fathers." (Acts xxiv.13-14). That heretical way, in Jewish eyes, could be Christianity, but it is just possible that he was referring to the *gnosis*, and it is interesting to note that one of the companions whose presence in the temple got him into trouble was an Ephesian called Trophimus, and to remember that the famous college at ancient Ephesus was a focal point of mystic doctrines. The first Epistle to the Corinthians was evidently written there; or Paul tells his friends, "I will tarry at Ephesus until Pentecost, for a great door and effectual is opened unto me" (I Cor. xvi.8-9). Christians naturally take this as implying an opportunity for missionary effort, but again it might be that Paul was visualizing a union between the ancient teachings and the new and was seizing the chance to study this.

To quote Dr. Inge again: "The well-marked development in his [Paul's] thought has been described as a gradual approach to the Hellenistic mystery religions."[4] Could it not equally be the assimilation of the popular beliefs concerning Jesus into the mind of a Gnostic mystic? Dr. Inge does not try to play down this development — "The change in

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[2] *The Riddle of the New Testament*

[3] *The Legacy of Greece* (Oxford University Press), p. 50

[4] *Mysticism in Religion* (Hutchinson's University Library), p. 33

the thought of St. Paul is unmistakable" — but, on the contrary, points out that the apostle was more and more possessed by "the realization which was the spiritual core of the Hellenistic mystery cults, that of a corporate union between the Head and the members of a body." Such union was attained through *knowledge*. (Students of Theosophy will interpret that word correctly. "Learn above all," says *The Voice of the Silence*, "to separate Head-learning from Soul-wisdom.") Knowledge of this sort is *buddhic*; it pertains to the highest part of our nature, that which Plato calls *nous* and Paul *pneuma* — *pneuma* being, says Dr. Inge, "both ourselves and not ourselves; it is the realization of what God means us to be." This is in accord with Theosophic teaching regarding the real Individuality or Spiritual Ego.

Dr. Inge fully recognizes the close similarity between Paul's teaching and that of the Mystery cults.[5] From the qualified statement, "The notion of salvation as consisting in the knowledge of God is not infrequent in St. Paul," he proceeds to a still more open one: "On the whole, he [Paul] is consistent in treating knowledge as the crown and consummation of faith." This vital knowledge is attained by devotion to and identification with the Christ-principle. "Christ-mysticism is the kernel of St. Paul's religion. It is not a doctrine about Christ ... it is fellowship with a life-giving power, a spiritual reality and energy." (Cf. Paul's words in Ephesians III.19: "The *love* of Christ, which passeth knowledge.") This is the key to all Paul's fervent preaching about dying and rising again — rising above our lower selves till we come "unto a perfect man, unto the measure of the stature of the fullness of Christ" (Eph. IV.13) — and it also explains his seeming indifference to the life of the Jesus of the Gospels, save in so far as he uses the Resurrection symbolism.

It is good to think of Paul as a Gnostic. He is too noble a teacher to be limited by the dogmas of any one creed, especially such harsh ones as have been imputed to him. He has been accused of distorting the Christian faith at the outset. "Perhaps no great man in history," says Dr. Inge, "has been so much-misunderstood and misrepresented."[6] And it is good to see how his doctrines fall into harmony with the ancient cults, for, if Truth is *one*, and changeless, every exponent of it must of necessity teach the *WISDOM-RELIGION*.

JOAN N. BURNETT

(To be concluded)

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[5] *Ibid.*, pp. 33 *et seq.*

[6] *Ibid.*

DOROTHY HEWLETT

On Christina Rossetti

[Miss Dorothy Hewlett, an old friend and contributor, is a distinguished writer and critic. She is especially well known as a student of the Romantic Movement in English literature and an authority on Keats. Her *Life of Keats* has gone through more than one revised and enlarged edition. She is prominent also in the work of the Keats-Shelley Memorial Association and the Honorary Editor and publisher of the Association's quarterly *Bulletin*. In this brief article she writes with insight on some rather neglected aspects of Christina Rossetti.—ED.]

IN THE SUMMER OF 1849 a girl of eighteen lay dangerously ill, afflicted in body but clear in mind except for a pervading melancholy. Those in attendance were her sister and mother, a mother much beloved to whom Christina was later to write in a dedicatory sonnet:

> To my first Love, my Mother, on whose knee
> I learnt love-lore that is not troublesome:
> Whose service is my special dignity,
> And she my lodestar while I go and come.

The sister, a woman of strong mind devoted to the Anglican Church, who ended her life as a nun in a closed order, was also a potent influence. To these women Christina dictated poems as she lay on her sickbed, poems of which at least the sonnet "One Certainty" is in the authentic voice of her maturity. Beginning "Vanities of vanities, the Preacher saith," it concludes with these lines:

> And there is nothing new under the sun:
> Until the ancient race of Time be run,
> The old thorns shall grow out of the old stem,
> And morning shall be cold and twilight grey.

Here already is the slow, grave lovely rhythm so characteristic of Christina Rossetti. Here also is the fundamental pessimism, or perhaps one should say stark realism of outlook: and yet, in spite of illness, there seemed superficially at this time reason for a brighter view of life. Christina was engaged to marry James Collinson, an artist of her brother Dante Gabriel's Pre-Raphaelite group.

But perhaps her mind was troubled at the prospect of marriage; for soon she was to break off the engagement, ostensibly on religious grounds. Collinson had left the Church of England for Rome; then, on Christina's protest, returned to the Anglican faith, only to secede again. It is true that, backed by her mother and uncompromising sister, Christina may

have refused Collinson on religious grounds; yet she herself was a child and grandchild of happy mixed marriages, her father and her grandfather Polidori both being Italian Catholic exiles. Or might the difference in religion have formed a handy excuse? One wonders. Collinson, a lethargic type tending to fall asleep at odd times, and obviously a vacillator, was hardly fit mate for a beautiful, gifted girl, one surrounded by a highly intellectual and lively group of young men. The only other suitor of whom we know was Charles Cayley, a pupil of her father's, a scholar and translator of Dante. He also is said to have been rejected on religious grounds.

Christina Rossetti has given us a wealth of love poetry, poetry of a love frustrated, a love bringing with it a strong sense of guilt. William, her younger brother, maintaining that Christina's lyrical verse was entirely personal, after her death asserted that these ardent poems were addressed to Cayley. This belief he seems to have founded on some confused and half articulate murmurings on her deathbed of being "so fond of" Cayley.

Apart from the fact that "so fond of" is a feeble expression for passionate love and one out of character, Cayley, from William's own description of him, hardly seems a likely object of high passion. He presents Cayley as a prim, absent-minded shabby man:

> If anything was said to him, he would often pause so long before replying that one was inclined to "give it up," but at last the answer came in a tone between hurry and confusion, with an articulation far from easy to follow. In truth one viewed his advent with some apprehension, only too conscious that some degree of embarrassment was sure to ensue.

Since Christina, though an affectionate sister, was intensely reserved, it may well be that William grasped at this one clue to what had been to him an enigma in his sister's life; or was he being disingenuous? May he have been pulling down a decorous Victorian blind on the origin of an unmaidenly passion, one of self-accusation and despair?

There is among the love poems only one really happy in tone, the exulting "A Birthday" of which I quote the first verse, ringing out like a pæan of victory.

> My heart is like a singing bird
> Whose nest is in a watered shoot;
> My heart is like an apple-tree
> Whose boughs are bent with thickset fruit;
> My heart is like a rainbow shell
> That paddles in a halcyon sea;
> My heart is gladder than all these
> Because my love is come to me.

A recent biographer, Lona Mosk Packer, suggests, with a good deal of circumstantial evidence, that this lover was William Bell Scott, a minor artist and assiduous versifier. Scott, a Byronic figure, virile, unscrupulous, was an intimate of the Pre-Raphaelite group for some years before he revealed himself as a married man. But whoever he was whom Christina loved her passion lasted on memory, heavily weighted with guilt. In a life pure to saintliness, rich in service, a dedication to Christ her Saviour was long muddied, obscured:

> My faith burns low, my hope burns low,
> Only my heart's desire cries out in me
> By the deep thunder of its want and woe,
> Cries out to Thee.

Christina wrote romantic tales in the manner of her circle, "Goblin Market" being the poem on which a reputation was founded in her own day; but I think it is the love poetry which mainly appeals to us, and especially the series of sonnets "Monna Innominata." This "unnamed lady" is one of those who before the time of Beatrice and Laura, the two enthroned loves of Dante and Petrarca, were (to quote Christina herself)

> sung by a school of less conspicuous poets ... one can imagine many a lady as sharing her lover's poetic aptitude while the barrier between them might be one held sacred by both, yet not such as to render mutual love incompatible with mutual honour.

The last of this beautiful series is the most moving:

> Youth gone, and beauty gone if ever there
> Dwelt beauty in so poor a face as this;
> Youth gone and beauty, what remains of bliss?
> I will not bind fresh roses in my hair,
> To shame a cheek at best but little fair,—
> Leave youth his roses, who can bear a thorn,—
> I will not seek for blossoms anywhere,
> Except such common flowers as blow with corn.
> Youth gone and beauty gone, what doth remain?
> The longing of a heart pent up forlorn,
> A silent heart whose silence loves and longs;
> The silence of a heart that sang its songs
> While youth and beauty made a summer morn,
> Silence of love that cannot sing again.

Even apart from her love poems the bulk of Christina's work is pervaded by a feeling of loss and doom. She was an invalid on and off for many years, fretted by straitened means and always haunted by death. One by one the loved ones of an intimate family circle left her. Maria,

already cut off in a closed order, died first, then Gabriel, then the adored mother. The one brother left, William Michael, the prop and backbone of the family, was, it is true, still living and active on her behalf but, though she loved him greatly, there was not the same sympathy and understanding as between herself and the poet Gabriel. He, who read most of her work in manuscript, although intensely admiring it could affectionately poke fun at her "bogey" poems with their ghosts and charnel memories.

As time went on, and she was more and more mentally isolated, tied to London by the care of two old aunts, Christina's religous fervour grew, but hag-ridden by that sense of sin. An extreme example of this is her quite frightening sonnet "The World":

> By day she woos me, soft, exceeding fair:
> But all night as the moon so changeth she;
> Loathesome and foul with hideous leprosy
> And subtle serpents gliding in her hair.
> By day she woos me to the outer air,
> Ripe fruits, sweet flowers, and full satiety:
> But through the night a beast she grins at me,
> A very monster void of love and prayer.
> By day she stands a lie: by night she stands
> In all the naked horror of the truth,
> With pushing horns and clawed and clutching hands.
> Is this a friend indeed; that I should sell
> My soul to her, give her my life and youth,
> Till my feet, cloven too, take hold on hell?

It seems odd, and ungrateful to the beauty of God's earth, that Christina should include "Ripe fruits, sweet flowers" among the world's foul temptations. But happily to set against that we have quiet nature celebrations such as "A Green Corn-field," "The Lambs of Grasmere," "Venus's Looking-Glass," and "Bird Raptures" with its praise of that bird so dear to our Romantics, the nightingale. Here are no mere snares of the world but a treasure to be laid up.

In the final years she saw little of the country, hardly ever leaving her home in Torrington Square. Eased of domestic cares by the death of her aunts and left comfortably off by them, Christina gave her time, apart from some pleasant verses for children, to devotional works in poetry and prose. Here we see her approaching to a more serene acceptance, a larger comprehension of God's goodness, writing near the end of her life:

> Death is not death, and therefore do I hope:
> Nor silence silence; and I therefore sing
> A very humble hopeful quiet psalm,

Searching my heart-field for an offering;
A handful of sun-courting heliotrope,
Of myrrh a bundle, and a little balm.

DOROTHY HEWLETT

Claude Houghton

Claude Houghton, who died 1961, was well known to readers of THE ARYAN PATH for his fantastic short tales ("Mr. Bramley's Date with Destiny," "The Man Who Met Himself," etc.) and for his articles with their original psychological twist. Sylva Norman writes most perceptively on him in No. 5 (30 January 1969) of a series entitled "Reputations" in the *Times Literary Supplement*, devoted to writers whose names and works have gone into undeserved obscuration after their deaths.

She writes of his distinctive vision, ahead of his times, of his blending of immaterial mystery with realism, humour, and "a merciless portrayal of unredeemed humanity." Her tribute mainly centres upon the inner meaning of the novel *Julian Grant Loses His Way*, in which the latter's life-panorama unrolls allegorically in his post-mortem mind (the "next world"). It forces him to recognize that, at each successive moment of choice between the two sides of his nature, he has made meanness and evil his good, destroying others in his fall. His "hell" is his own creation, from which, as Sylva Norman surmises, escape is thus possible. She suggests that the feeling of urgency pervading Houghton's novels is due to his "warm spiritual conviction of humanity's need ... to be born again ... here and now, discovering the heaven, that, as surely as the hell, exists within his being." To that same conviction is due his wonderful early book of essays, *The Kingdoms of the Spirit*.

This last could well be read with an earlier anonymous mystical book, *Through the Gates of Gold* (1887), for undoubtedly Houghton had glimpsed, if from afar on the heights, the Gates of Gold that "admit us to the sanctuary of man's own nature, to the place whence his life-power comes." "Only the man who has the potentialities in him both of the voluptuary and the stoic has any chance of entering." He achieves this not by crushing out his animal nature, but by understanding and subordinating it to the god in himself. Houghton's writings depict, intensely, aspects of that inner struggle of dual man with himself, and it is good that Sylva Norman has brushed off the dust settling on his image, and put the latter again on view.

W. E. WHITEMAN

H. SUNDER RAO

Shakespeare's Iago: The Fatal Hard Heart

[Shri H. Sunder Rao, M.A., taught English Literature for a long time before he retired from the teaching profession as a Principal. Readers may remember his earlier article "The Theme of Redemption in *King Lear*" in October 1967. Once again he writes with deep feeling as well as a sensitive knowledge of the Shakespearian background. The fate and fatalness of Iago suggest to him a parallel with a lasting moral and spiritual truth: that a man can remain human and retain his link with the divine nature only by means of a loving heart that shares the inner life of his fellow creatures.—ED.]

THE *Gītā* has an expressive word to describe those who are dedicated to evil. It calls them *naṣṭātmānaḥ,* ruined or lost souls. They are the men of *āsurī* or demoniac qualities as distinguished from those who possess *daivī* or divine qualities. These two types are described with profound psychological insight in the sixteenth chapter of the *Gītā*. The evil man, according to the description, is essentially one who denies God and regards the world as being without a moral basis. He is without love, compassion, or fellow feeling and is given over to egoism and hatred of his fellow men. Full of lust, pride, and revengefulness, such men are born for the destruction of the world, *kṣayāya jagataḥ,* and are mankind's enemies, *ahitāḥ.*

Shakespeare's Iago is a frightening embodiment of the *āsurī* qualities described in the *Gītā*. He is, perhaps, the most irretrievably "lost soul" among Shakespeare's villains, acquiring a sort of evil "transcendence" like Goethe's Mephistopheles. In one sense, he towers high above the mortal frame of things — an almost deathless figure of supreme evil. One of the tremendous phrases in the play occurs when, after Othello runs with his sword at him, Iago bleeds, "but not kill'd." At such moments, he ceases to be a mere individual and becomes a universal symbol of destruction casting his perennial dark shadow over the world of ordinary mortals. a figure of terrific dimensions, tainted ineffably by the "cumulative corruptions of the world." Othello calls him a "demi-devil"; he is "more fell than anguish, hunger or the sea" as Lodovico describes him. Yet, the most fascinating thing about Iago is that this distance and inaccessibility do not make him a shadowy figure. Shakespeare has made him real and immensely credible. He is simply the self-alienated man who refuses to involve himself in the normal life of his fellow men, and stands apart from their joys and sufferings. So he is abnormal, but not super-human or a mere symbol or abstraction. Not that he is unaware of the ordinary concerns of life. He does recognize what is good, beautiful, and true. But his recognition is only intellectual. It is part of his pose in pursuance of

his characteristic philosophy that no wise man will "wear his heart upon his sleeve." As he himself says: "I am not what I am." The most terrifying thing about him is that he has no moral involvement in human ties and obligations, and is incapable of moral emotion. He recognizes Desdemona's virtue and innocence, Othello's nobility and open nature, and the "daily beauty" in Cassio's life. But essentially, he is a heartless and passionless man and knows nothing of love and compassion. He has no ears to listen to the grandeur in the beatings of the heart, nor does he know anything of what Keats calls "the holiness of the Heart's affections."

In Iago, Shakespeare has represented the utmost limit of human heartlessness. Theodore Spencer's view is that Iago is "an emotional eunuch." His nature is cold, cynical, and opportunistic. He has a cankered heart and he is incapable of any kind of warm feeling for others. He sneers at virtue and has the evil man's instinctive contempt for goodness and nobility. Any idea of suffering for love or sacrifice for a noble aim is beyond his limited understanding. He evaluates life only in terms of success and failure. Disinterested love and service are meaningless terms to him. He follows Othello only to serve "my turn upon him." A man's first duty is to himself, "to do himself homage." Only such people, according to Iago, "have some soul." One of the key passages in the play, so far as Iago is concerned, is the one in which he refers to virtue:

> "Virtue! a fig! 'tis in ourselves that we are thus or thus. Our bodies are gardens, to the which our wills are gardeners; so that if we will plant nettles or sow lettuce ... either to have it sterile with idleness or manured with industry, why, the power and corrigible authority of this lies in our wills." (Act I, Sc. iii)

He is the great apostle of "will' and "reason." Even love is nothing but "a lust of the blood and a permission of the will." He has no faith in the sanctities of life. His cynicism degrades everything he touches. He is "nothing, if not critical." His world is a world without beauty or colour; it is all a drab, harsh, and relentless place, where the highest ethical awareness consists in how "to distinguish betwixt a benefit and an injury." It is characteristic of him that in the terrible Temptation Scene (Act III, Sc. iii) where his intellectual resourcefulness and his cunning are displayed at their highest, his words freeze and send a chill of horror through us. There is "a jet of poison" in every word he utters. The whole thing is diabolical in the extreme. His sense of situation, his supreme manipulative genius, and his consummate artistry in appearing to be what he is not compel our admiration. He plays with the happiness of others with absolute callousness almost as if he were a figure of malignant Destiny bent upon universal destruction. His mind is alert and active. He is the

supreme rationalist in Shakespeare's plays. But Iago's "reason" is not reason in her most exalted mood, not the godly power of discrimination, *viveka,* of which the *Gītā* speaks. It is the power to calculate chances, to foresee errors, to ensure success at all costs, and finally to work the ruin of others. It is an unscrupulous, pitiless power, completely divorced from the sense of mercy, forgiveness, and humanity. Iago's mind works faultlessly in the realm of intrigue. The world exists for him to be exploited to his advantage. His keenness of mind is an invaluable aid to his plan of revenge. Of the higher powers of the mind, its perceptive powers, its capacity to look into the life of things, its insights, Iago has absolutely no idea.

Iago's "reason" is thus a disruptive power — an effective instrument of his egoism. He is able to pervert and distort everything, and turns the very virtues of his victims into "pitch" and out of their own goodness makes the net "that shall enmesh them all." He is an individualist to the core and woefully deficient in the large social sense which is the distinguishing mark of a humane person. He has no sense of human fellowship and is an arch-disrupter. He revels in his solitariness and as G. Wilson Knight says, "he is the spirit of denial — wholly negative." His tragedy arises because what he ultimately denies is his own "self," the immortal divine link which binds a man to his fellow men and the rest of the world. He is thus a spiritual secessionist, basically alone, self-banished from the world of ordinary men and women. It was Donne who said that no man is an island and that each man should be "involved in mankind." Iago has repudiated this fundamental bond between one man and another — the link which affirms each one's sharing of the common human condition. His occasional social graces, his rare moments of solicitude for those in trouble, his dry humour and sardonic wit, are certainly not natural to him. They are part of a huge pose — a trick with which he seeks to fulfil his evil aims. In this he is aided by his immense powers of self-control. His detachment and self-possession are superb; but this detachment does not proceed from any deep spiritual source within him. It is the result of his extraordinary capacity to dissimulate. It gives him his amazing power to destroy the love of Othello and Desdemona and create chaos around him.

He makes his moves with tremendous self-assurance. Nothing daunts him. He is impervious to scruples and is driven irresistibly by his dynamic will power. He knows that even the slightest capitulation of a man's will is enough to ruin him. Iago is supremely self-confident. Once he allows his will-power to weaken, or he shows signs of vacillation or begins to relent, he knows that he will be irretrievably ruined. So he stands distant and aloof, avoiding all emotional involvement with those around him, a

figure of grim watchfulness, coldly and dispassionately making his moves, using every weakness of his victims to bring about their ruin. Any surrender of the heart to the needs of others is a mark of worldly failure.

Such is Iago's deadly philosophy. He does not want the heart's affections to come in the way of his grim purposes. It was St. Catharine of Genoa who is reported to have declared: "If of that which this heart of mine is feeling, one drop were to fall into hell, hell itself would become all life eternal." Such is the divine power of love and compassion. But Iago is incapable of feeling. The world of passions, nobilities and ecstasies is alien to him. His devilish lack of feeling is seen at its worst when after the heart-broken Desdemona appeals to him to help her recover Othello's love, he answers her: "Go in; weep not, all things shall be well." The same exultation in another's suffering is seen in his words when he watches the visible agony of Othello:

> Not poppy, nor mandragora,
> Nor all the drowsy syrups of the world
> Shall ever medicine thee to that sweet sleep
> Which thou owedst yesterday. (Act III, Sc. iii)

At such times, in the words of G. B. Harrison, "Iago is beyond forgiveness."

In Iago, Shakespeare undoubtedly probed the darkest depths of human evil. In *Othello* evil's main target is the beauty and sanctity of the heart's affections. It shatters human bonds. The play reveals the absolute futility of a creed that is heartless — the doctrine of the supremacy of will-power exercised for the sole purpose of gratifying personal egoism. We are today facing a similar predicament. Evil has assumed protean forms in this strife-ridden and fear-tormented age. Iago's doctrine of will-power and his cold, Machiavellian view of life, his superhuman dexterity in opportunistic manipulation, his utter moral numbness are not new to us. Most of us have become, like Iago, mere worshippers of the intellect, not the illuminating *buddhi* of which the ancient Aryan scriptures speak, but of that lower faculty of the mind which, while it helps us to analyse material phenomena and experience, miserably fails us when we are in search of a synthetic, comprehensive, universal vision of things. In our frantic search for technological marvels, we have forgotten to reckon with the moral law within. Iago saw things only from the surface, and it must be said that, within this limit, he saw them with unerring clarity. His reasoning power gave him immense mastery over the realm of facts, what may be called the "surface realities" of life, with which science mostly concerns itself. But there are deeper layers to life. Iago's explorations did not take him into the mystery of such things as love, pity, loyalty, and

compassion. This world of emotional sanctities was totally strange to him, and whenever he refers to them, he is either vapidly superficial or blatantly cynical. He could hardly know the tremendous self-transcending power of love, for instance, and it is this love, with its undying loyalty, its superhuman strength and divine beauty, that ultimately vanquishes him. His dreary heart, void of pity and compassion, insensitive to the needs and sufferings of others, could hardly understand this power against which he pitted himself in his struggle to achieve inhuman revenge and personal gratification. He is incapable of imagination, insight, and intuition — the great trinity of qualities by which men have glimpsed the divine Reality. The very love which he repudiates, the loyalty to fellow men from which he alienates himself, the deep truths of the heart which remain unvanquished even in the very presence of disaster and death, finally undo him. He can do nothing against the immensities of the heart. He does not know the infinite potentialities of the human heart or the amplitude of love's power. The evil man is, in a deep sense, a self-deluded man. He may be self-confident, sure of what he is doing, resourceful, cunning, and dynamic. But he does not know his real self, the vital and imperishable principle that links him with the world and his fellow creatures, and through them to God. His heart is dry, frigid, hard, and sterile. He is supreme in a world of shadows and make-believe. But the roots of his life are bound to wither and rot away for want of the nourishing waters of the heart's tenderness, its joys and fears by which we live. In *King Lear*, the old King, subjected to prolonged physical suffering and agony of mind, asks the tremendous question: "Is there any cause that makes these hard hearts?" Why are some men so devoid of pity and love? The answer is not easy and, perhaps, not very important. But it is far more important that, at a time like ours, we should recognize evil's omnipresence and omnipotence and understand its nature. Here, Iago provides us with a grim warning, for Iago, as Theodore Spencer most aptly puts it, embodies the concept of the evil man as "the incomplete man." Such men, who have alienated themselves from human ties and obligations, from love, loyalty, and fellow feeling, can become instruments of doom, however brilliant or gifted they might otherwise be. One of the most distressing features of modern life is the increasing insensibility to human suffering, despite our boasted advances in science and technology. There is thus a great need to re-establish today the power of what might be called the Doctrine of the Heart — the doctrine of love and compassion, for unless the wisdom of the heart shapes the intellect of man, and the intellect and the heart work harmoniously together, man will remain incomplete, fragmented, and disintegrated. Helen Gardner says that Shakespeare's *King Lear* must have risen out of the same mood as

made Keats declare: "I am certain of nothing but of the holiness of the Heart's affections and the truth of Imagination." It will not be wrong to say that *Othello*, too, was born out of the same mood. To avert the grim tragedy of man's inner incompleteness and spiritual emptiness is, indeed, the most urgent task of our times.

H. SUNDER RAO

If a delicious fragrant fruit had a power of separating itself from the rich spirit, fine taste, smell and colour, which it receives from the virtue of the air and the spirit of the sun, or if it could, in the beginning of its growth, turn away from the sun and receive no virtue from it, then it would stand in its own first birth of wrath, sourness, bitterness, astringency, just as the devils do, who have turned back into their own dark root and have rejected the Light and Spirit of God. So that the hellish nature of a devil is nothing but its own first forms of life withdrawn or separated from the heavenly Light and Love; just as the sourness, bitterness and astringency of a fruit are nothing else but the first form of its vegetable life, before it has reached the virtue of the sun and the spirit of the air. And as a fruit, if it had a sensibility of itself, would be full of torment as soon as it was shut up in the first forms of its life, in its own astringency, sourness and stinging bitterness, so the angels, when they had turned back into these very same first forms of their own life, and broke off from the heavenly Light and Love of God, became their own hell. No hell was made for them, no new qualities came into them, no vengeance or pains from the Lord of Love fell on them; they only stood in that state of division and separation from the Son and Holy Spirit of God, which by their own motion they had made for themselves. They had nothing in them but what they had from God, the first forms of a heavenly life; but they had them in a state of self-torment, because they had separated them from birth of Love and Light

—WILLIAM LAW

New Books and Old

"Thirty Years of Buddhist Studies"*

To students interested in Buddhism, the publication of a book by Dr. Edward Conze is always a significant event. This volume consists of articles published by Dr. Conze in various journals over a period of thirty years, and here brought together in the hope that they might be of assistance to Buddhist scholarship. That this objective is more than adequately met should be obvious to the reader who glances through the first few articles of the book. More than academic scholarship, there is in them a certain clarity and fairness of presentation which are among the most significant features of Dr. Conze's writings. To students of religion and philosophy this volume will be an invaluable guide.

It contains both translations and original essays published in *The Middle Way, The Mahabodhi, Philosophy East and West* and other important and well known journals. The collection contains two surveys: the first shows the important and revolutionary changes which have taken place in the study of Buddhism during the last twenty years, and the second is a general survey of Mahāyāna Buddhism. There are translations of Buddhaghoṣa's Meditation on Death, the Lotus of the Good Law, the Perfection of Wisdom and the *Prajñāpāramitā-hṛdaya Sūtra*. The book concludes with two interesting and highly educative articles on "Buddhist Philosophy and Its European Parallels" and "Spurious Parallels to Buddhist Philosophy."

The articles on Mahāyāna Buddhism, which occupy nearly fifty-five pages of the book are perhaps the most interesting and authoritative account of the doctrine of salvation through the merit of the three Saviours of the Mahāyāna Pantheon — Avalokiteśvara, Tārā, and Amitābha. Though the activities of these Bodhisattvas must seem quite miraculous and extraordinary they operate strictly within the law of Karma, and the power to do good is based on the enormous amount of merit (*Puṇya*) which they have accumulated. As long as we stay within the strictly *moral* sphere, there is some correspondence and proportion between virtue and reward; but this correspondence no longer holds good in the *spiritual* sphere. This is so because in the spiritual sphere, we are in touch with a Transcendent Reality in which a simple act of faith when turned on the Buddha or a Bodhisattva produces inconceivable merit which outweighs countless moral defaults. A Bodhisattva who has accumulated enough merit to attain *Nirvāṇa* bestows all further merit generated by his good deeds on others by repeating the following words: "I turn over into full enlightenment the meritorious work founded on jubilation. May it feed the full enlightenment of myself and of all beings!"

According to Dr. Conze the two great contributions which the Mahāyāna has made to human thought are the creation of the Bodhisattva ideal and the elaboration of the doctrine of "Emptiness." The Bodhisattva is a person who is motivated by a desire to win full enlightenment and who postpones his entrance into the bliss of *Nirvāṇa* in order to help all suffering creatures. He is thus actuated by two great motives — *Mahā-karuṇā* (All-comprehensive Compassion) and *Mahā-prajñā* (All-comprehensive Wisdom). His compassion extends to all sentient beings, men,

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* *Thirty Years of Buddhist Studies: Selected Essays.* By EDWARD CONZE. (Bruno Cassirer, Oxford. 274 pp. 1967. 42s.)

animals, birds, fishes, worms and all other creatures including the *pretas, yakhas,* and other denizens of the hellish regions. But mere compassion is blind unless it is reinforced by Wisdom, and a third quality equally important, viz. *Upāya* or skill in means. Among the six perfections through which the Bodhisattva has to pass, the perfection of Wisdom is the apex and culmination. The other *pāramitās* are the perfection of Giving, Morality, Patience, Vigour, and Concentration. As the *Aṣṭasāhasrikā* puts it:

> Just as blind people cannot find their way unguided into a City, so only the perfection of wisdom imparts to the other perfections an organ of vision which allows them to ascend the path to all-knowledge and to reach all-knowledge.

The Mahāyāna distinguishes ten stages through which a Bodhisattva has to pass. He is entitled to *Nirvāṇa* at the sixth stage but he voluntarily renounces it and during the seventh to tenth stages he assumes many celestial forms and becomes Avalokiteśvara during the ninth stage, or Mañjuśrī, Maitreya, or Kṣitigarbha, who descends to hellish regions to look after the welfare of those unfortunate beings.

The doctrine of Emptiness was developed by the Mahāsānghikas. They maintain that all things are empty in the sense that Transcendental Reality is beyond the grasp of intellectual comprehension and verbal expression. One should not seize on anything or "grasp" at it because that would involve an act of preference bound up with self-interest. Emptiness is also called "Suchness." The Yogācārin philosophy maintains that consciousness can exist by itself without an object. True existence is "Thought only," pure consciousness which transcends the division between object and subject.

Another essay that must be mentioned is "The Meditation on Death." Buddhaghoṣa maintains that the only two meditations which are always and under all circumstances beneficial are the development of friendliness and the recollection of death. Plato held a similar view that the true votaries of knowledge practise nothing else but how to die or to meet death.

The book concludes with two very valuable chapters on "Buddhist Philosophy and Its European Parallels" and "Spurious Parallels to Buddhist Philosophy."

In a short review, it is impossible to convey the wealth of scholarship and material that is packed into the pages of this invaluable work. The author in his Foreword expresses concern for his patient publisher and hopes that he will not lose money on this venture. It would be a sad reflection on the reading public if a valuable book like this did not get the wide circulation it deserves. Let us hope that the author's fears prove unfounded; and that the publisher will gladly undertake the responsibility of giving the public the promised second volume to be called *Further Buddhist Studies.*

B. V. NARAYANA REDDY

Islamic Modernism in India and Pakistan 1857–1964. By AZIZ AHMAD. (Oxford University Press, London. 194 pp. 1967. Rs. 40.00)

There are three main kinds of Muslims in India today: those that have no time for religion, but profess to lead a righteous life; those that admire the orthodox faith, whether they conform to it completely or not; and those that profess Islam, but wish it to be reformed. It is with the last category that we are concerned.

The reformers may again be roughly classified as follows: (A) those, like Azad and Iqbal, who profess to reinterpret Islam within the framework of classical Islam; (B) those, like Jawed and others, who give a modern interpretation to classical norms: for in-

stance Jawed proposes to translate *shayṭān* (Satan), originally an evil spirit taken over by Islam from Ethiopian folklore, as the spirit of Evil, and "angel" as the spirit of good, or the Absolute Good; and (c) yet others who would interpret Islam on a historical basis, seeing in it the wisdom of the Semitic race as articulated in the theology of Judaism, Christianity, and Islam: they recognize the evolution of the human religious spirit in its historical context, and are profoundly affected by the "higher criticism" of Biblical scholars and such historical theories as Toynbee propounds.

After a brief historical introduction, dealing with law and religion during the British period, the author discusses Sayyid Ahmad Khan and his Aligarh Movement. This is probably the best part of the book and complements what Mujeeb has to say in his well-known work on *The Indian Muslims* (London, Unwin, 1967). He then passes on to the Radicalism of Chiragh Ali and, later, Shibli and Ameer Ali. Then came the reaction with the *ahl-i ḥadīth,* the Neo-traditionists who wanted to go back to the practice and the thought of the Prophet himself. Finally we have a sound treatment of Iqbal and Mawlana Abul Kalam Azad.

Professor Aziz Ahmad is a Professor of Islamic Studies at Toronto University (Canada), and apart from a professional knowledge of the languages concerned (Arabic, Persian, Urdu), brings to his task the twin qualifications of scientific objectivity and critical examination of the vast material available. His work is an object-lesson in how such diverse materials may be presented within a manageable compass.

The author established his enviable reputation by his standard book, *Studies in Islamic Culture in the Indian Environment,* a few years ago, and with the publication of this volume, he will be recognized as one of the three most illuminating authors on Indian Islam, the other two being Mujeeb and Abid Husain; and no higher praise need be given.

Professor Aziz Ahmad has avoided with a Graeco-European spirit the intrusion of his own views on the subject, and we hope in time to come he will expand himself and give to his readers the fruits of his own mature reflection and exhaustive study.

A. A. A. FYZEE

Chinese Mythology. By ANTHONY CHRISTIE. (Paul Hamlyn, Feltham, Middlesex. 141 pp. 28 colour plates. Over 100 black and white illustrations. 1968. 17*s.* 6*d.*)

This, the ninth of the Hamlyn Mythology Series, gives, as usual, amazing value in contents and production. The delightful illustrations first catch attention. With what fluidity these Chinese combine strength and delicacy! How numinous are their landscapes! What liveliness they impart to their animals, to demons or cosmic gods! What serene cheerfulness is shown by their goddesses and sages! The majestic pottery figure of a green-visaged Judge of Hell is awe-ful rather than the terrifying nightmare a medieval Flemish or German artist would have made him. Even Yama, King of the Seventh Hell, smiles indulgently at two joyfully cavorting demons and a small dog, driving condemned souls into a shallow river.

A historical sketch of the early periods gives the background for the sources of the myths. The themes often have parallels in other countries. From the egg of chaos comes Phan-ku, with Heaven and Earth (*Yang* and *Yin*); in India, Brahmā, the creative deity, springs from an egg, and divides himself into Virāj-Vāch (male and female). The Five Holy Mountains, four at the cardinal corners and one in the centre, point to a fundamental pattern. The legendary Emperors who protected and instructed their subjects in the useful arts resemble the Divine Kings of Egypt and elsewhere. The Hero-gods,

"exiles from heaven" seem brothers to the Egyptian "colony of the gods."

The author makes the point that the Chinese were devoted to "order," more interested in the world's structure than in "creation," and so they built up the picture of a complex organization of cosmic powers. The supreme Deity, Thien (a non-anthropomorphic concept) ruled the world, its elements, and beings, through ministerial hierarchies and a vast retinue. Every aspect of man's life — even the humblest physiological function — had its attendant deity. The idea of reverence prevailed throughout. The imperial rule on earth, with its departmental bureaucracy, was planned to reflect the higher order, though the rigidity of human organization that developed on earth obviously had anthropomorphic repercussions on the images of the heavenly functionaries.

Other stories, seemingly at a more fanciful level, relate to animals, plants, and such like, though surely the famous *Monkey,* outlined here, has a psychological, allegorical meaning that puts it in another class.

The book is tantalizing in that, while the interpretation largely eludes us, we can sense significance in the varying myths generously spread before us. But at whatever level we take it, the book is a delight to possess.

L. MARR

Pa Chin and His Writings. By OLGA LANG. (Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Mass., U.S.A. 402 pp. 1967. $7.95)

Here in India, the average reader knows very little about social and intellectual life in China, especially in recent times. In modern China, literature has been valued only as a tool for political and ideological propaganda; and as in other communist countries there has been conflict between the Communist Party and the pure intellectuals. This book deals with the writings of Pa Chin, novelist and short-story-writer, whose writings were very popular with the younger generation during the crucial pre-revolutionary period between 1919 and 1949. Subsequent to the Revolution he has been in the background, although still continuing to write. Though still widely read, he is usually referred to as one of the "writers of the last generation."

The author herself is a versatile and cosmopolitan person. Born and educated in Russia, she has lived and studied in England, Germany, and China before going to the United States and settling down as a Professor of the Russian langauge, journalist, and research worker on problems of Chinese-Russian cultural relations, for which she is uniquely qualified by her background. In this work, which is a pioneer in its own kind, she brings her insight to bear upon the influence of international anarchism and Russian populism upon Pa Chin's political ideas and of Russian and French writers on his literary work.

Pa Chin was born in 1904. His adolescence and early youth spanned a time of civil war and revolution; and his early manhood coincided with the Kuomintang decade. He was an anarchist by the time he was fifteen. The main characters of all his novels are rebels and revolutionaries, mostly young men who had begun to "shoulder the responsibility for their country." But he depicts a variety of other types also, those who live according to the traditional Chinese pattern and those others who, while espousing modern individualism, continue to live a selfish life unmindful of the fate of their countrymen. Pa Chin was primarily a realist with a strong strain of romantic sentiment, idealizing self-sacrifice for an anarchist cause which is very vaguely conceived.

From the social angle, the novels depict a situation in which the time-honoured centrality of the Chinese family is challenged from two sides simultaneously: by the individual proclaiming his rights on the one hand,

and on the other by a feeling of loyalty to the community as a whole as against the family. As summed up in the Foreword, Pa Chin's

> young characters find themselves by sacrifice. But their culture and society give them no real sanction for an assertive individualism, no basis for defiance of their peer group, and in the end they enter rather easily into a new conformity.

Very few of Pa Chin's works have been translated; and this book, selectively read, should serve to give a valuable peep into the life of China at a crucial period of her history. The concluding chapter gives a brief account of his life and work after 1949. In spite of his advanced age Pa Chin is still said to be "a man of New Year's resolutions"; but rather disillusioned. He says: "it is as if my pen were alienated. I often feel sad, because my pen cannot fully express my ideas."

K. GURU DUTT

Religion in Practice. By SWAMI PRABHAVANANDA. With an Introduction by CHRISTOPHER ISHERWOOD. (George Allen and Unwin Ltd., London. 260 pp. 1968. 40*s*.)

Christopher Isherwood concludes his informative Introduction thus: "Until that day when I too can say 'I know,' I hold firmly to my belief in Prabhavananda's knowledge. It is all the reassurance and all the inspiration that I need." Certainly this book, based on lectures delivered to the Vedanta Society of Southern California, supports this view of the Swami's spiritual vision and understanding: impressive, too, are the easy manner and practical good sense shown in discussing the numerous problems of the modern world, many of which are aptly touched on in Part v: "Vital Questions on Religion Answered." Yet a dangerous facility can appear. e.g.: "Why do you dislike your work? Because you are not concentrated on it"; or, on meat-eating, "... even potatoes have life. ... Eat what agrees with you and what you can digest."

Welcome is the Swami's universalism. He shows a deep appreciation of Christ, yet also of the diverse emphases of the Hindu and Christian attitudes, e.g.:

> What the Hindus call an obstacle, Christians refer to as a "sin."
>
> The words "sin" and "virtue" are somewhat alien to the spirit of Vedanta, because they necessarily foster a sense of possessiveness with regard to thought and action. If we say, "I am good," or "I am bad," we are only talking the language of *maya* ...

He quotes Eckhart as representative of the higher *samādhi*, the *nirvikalpa*, where there is "neither *I* nor *you*, neither *one* nor *many*." At times a Hindu bias makes itself felt, as when criticizing the Christian social conscience, surely an imperative need in India's present anguish; sometimes this chauvinism appears in the naïve light of a false "universalism," e.g., "Vedanta is not a particular religion, but a religion which includes the basic truth of all religions," or the view of India as "peacemaker among the creeds" (cp. Hindu-Muslim riots), even "on an international scale." Yet such are small blemishes.

The volume deals successively with "The Problem," "The Goal," "The Methods," "The Exemplars" (Vivekananda and Ramakrishna spontaneously set on a level with Krishna, Buddha, and Christ), and the vital questions and replies already mentioned. Altogether a helpful guide, instinct with both charity and common sense.

TERENCE WHITE GERVAIS

Christians in the Technical and Social Revolutions of Our Time: Suggestions for Study and Action. By J. BROOKE MOSLEY. (A Forward Movement Miniature Book. Forward Movement Publications, Cincinnati, U.S.A. 141 pp. 1966. 25 cents)

When the milieu of all religions' faith and practices is either rapidly altering or at least subtly changing, contemporary Christian enquiry and theological exploration are devoting much attention to the relationship between belief and change. How far can traditional insights be modified, or reinterpreted, without destroying their essential eternal quality? Within Christianity, especially since the 1966 World Conference on Church and Society at Geneva and the 1968 World Council of Churches Assembly at Uppsala, the debate has struck deep. J. Brooke Mosley's *Christians in the Technical and Social Revolutions of Our Time* discusses the main issues of the former gathering, whose thinking has had wide influence within the Christian Church and beyond.

The world as common family, its unity increasingly realized by science and technology, forces the "Christian West" to reassess traditional attitudes to the rest of the globe; the sin of arrogance and superiority is recognized and condemned, even if not yet totally abandoned. As Bola Ige of Nigeria declared,

> there can be no peace in the world where two-thirds of mankind are patronizingly referred to as "the poor," "the underdeveloped," "the third world," and now "the newly awakened peoples" (p. 65).

Can the man of religion commend unequivocally the advance of science just because he believes the final end of man is beyond the grasp of science? The motivations and consequences of science must be judged:

> Much scientific research proceeds with no goal except the discovery of truth itself and much of it proceeds with socially commendable goals. We honour this quest and see in it a joyous human vocation under God (p. 56).

But where "greed and national pride" are the motives, man will look in vain for a constructive outcome.

Christianity today calls for both as full as possible an understanding of contemporary change, and interpretation in the light of what is ever new in its own message: "not simply to understand the world but to respond to the power of God which is recreating it" (p. 39). A brief, but highly compact, introduction to much contemporary Christian thinking.

BRIAN G. COOPER

Reflections of a Universal Idealist. By KARL HEUSSENSTAMM. (World Union, Pondicherry 2. 308 pp. 1968. Rs. 15.00; $3.00)

In this book Karl Heussenstamm reflects upon the implications of modern man's need to develop a universal consciousness and outlook. Thus the author puts himself in line with the strong band of individuals and organizations all over the world who are working for the cultivation of awareness of the world as one unit.

Although a world-wide movement towards world unity may be seen to exist, this point of view has not yet penetrated everyday life. People are still governed by their old prejudices. Ideologies, loyalties, affections, laws and institutions, education, and thought habits all still work strongly to oppose the growth of a human consciousness of community.

Thus we are confronted today by two opposing forces, one making for fragmentation and strife, the other for global consciousness and global organization.

The supreme task of the present generation is therefore to overcome traditional attitudes and beliefs and bring everyday life in tune with the

forward-looking spirit of the times. We must work to remove the obstacles that exist in men's minds and in the general organization of society as it now exists.

Such a call for world unity does not imply the elimination of the individual viewpoint. The individual viewpoint, whether cultural, national, or personal, must exist within the context of a basic world viewpoint.

The only way in which this basic world viewpoint can be brought effectively into everyday life is through the reorientation of education at all levels. Until that has been achieved every individual attempt to lead mankind towards a world community is of the utmost value and importance.

Such an attempt is found in this book, which is an arrangement of statements in fifteen groups under the headings of Spirit, Truth, Goodness, Beauty, Man, God, Religion, Science, Philosophy, Statesmanship, Revolution, Soul Force, The Seer, The Archetype, and Direction. Its aim is to point towards a transcendent unity of contrasts and thus give direction to humanity today. It presents "a way of life for the gradual enlightenment and transformation of the individual," and also "a vision of the future as a world brotherhood devoted to the search for truth, goodness, and beauty."

IRENE R. RAY

Russian Themes. By MIHAJLO MIHAJLOV. Translated by MARIJA MIHAJLOV. (Macdonald and Co. Ltd., London. 373 pp. 1968. 42*s*.)

"So long as the state exists there is no freedom," said Lenin; and in one of these critical essays on Russian literature and politics Mihajlo Mihajlov quotes him on the works of Dostoevsky (who has probably understood freedom as no other Russian has done): "I have no time for that trash." There is a sense in which this book by a Yugoslav lives and moves between those brief and contradictory remarks of Lenin's.

There is also a sense in which it is for that reason a difficult book for those who live in a Western democracy to understand, if only because we in the West tend to regard Yugoslavia simply as "one of the Iron Curtain countries," which ideologically it both is and is not. Mr. Mihajlov himself, an ardent socialist and anti-capitalist, but not a socialist realist or an orthodox Marxist, stands between Dostoevsky, whom he admires this side idolatry, yet cannot quite accept as "a mystic," and Lenin, at least in his more theoretically socialistic and humanitarian aspects as opposed to his actively political ones. For us, therefore, some of Mr. Mihajlov's literary judgements seem somewhat strange, and this is particularly so when he speaks of 'modernism' as he finds it (for example) in Andreyev, Zamyatin, and "Abram Tertz"; for much of this "modernism" seems to be what we (in Britain at least) should call "imagination," or that visionary and poetic quality which is far from being "realistic" or "naturalistic." That is of course a quality which socialist realism is under the necessity of attacking (especially when it results in Zamyatin's paradox, "Socialist realism is not realistic"); for it is a prime quality of freedom itself. At the same time we should perhaps more correctly equate what Mr. Mihajlov calls "modernism" with surrealism, a literary trend already on its way to oblivion in the West.

The confusions increase as we read. For instance, Mr. Mihajlov sees Alexander Grin and "Abram Tertz" as kindred writers; he also sees "Abram Tertz" and Orwell as kindred writers, and sees them as kindred, both to each other and to Dostoevsky, in their "mysticism" (a word surely never applied to Orwell before), while at the same time remarking on Orwell's "high degree of realism."

Such confusions inevitably arise, we believe, from Mr. Mihajlov's geographical and political situation as a Yugoslav, which situation inevitably unbalances his artistic understanding: he lives in a country, more or less under the Soviet heel (indeed he is at the moment Tito's political prisoner), in which it is impossible to distinguish art from politics, reality from realism. So Mr. Mihajlov praises certain Russian writers (and certain Western ones too) for reasons which we should not adduce, since we are fortunate enough still to be able to criticize literature objectively, and where necessary to accept and admire its subjectivity, without concern for its political implications. Thus while he can plainly see the meretriciousness of the over-praised Sholokov, always careful to pay lip-service to the state, he cannot accord greatness to Pasternak, who paid no lip-service to it at all, and whose *Dr. Zhivago* is probably the only great novel to have been written in Russia in the last half-century, and is great precisely with the greatness of Dostoevsky: greatness of inward and personal vision wholly transcending even those political situations with which it directly deals.

Nevertheless, and perhaps because of the critical confusions they demonstrate, these essays on Russian literature by a writer who is neither a Russian nor a Westerner are of great interest, and ought to be attended to in the West. Apart from anything else, they very amply justify Mr. Mihajlov's encouraging claims, that contemporary Russian readers are interested in anything but socialist realism, and that "spiritual life in the USSR is developing apace."

R. H. WARD

A History of Neo-African Literature: Writing in Two Continents. By JAN-HEINZ JAHN. Translated from the German by OLIVER COBURN and URSULA LEHRBURGER. (Faber and Faber Ltd., London. 302 pp. 1968. 70*s*.)

The author of this fascinating account of literary developments in Africa begins his study with an explanation of his use of the term "Neo-African Literature." Africa's written literature, he observes, originated in the "overlap" area of three cultures — the African, the Islamic-Arabic, and the Western. If Mr. Jahn is primarily concerned with the literature from the area where African and Western cultures overlap, he does point out that the first African writers whose works are known to us employed the Arabic script, and that the written literatures in the African languages Hausa and Swahili were the direct result of Arabic influence. On the early African scene, Mr. Jahn is informative. He is even better on the African Heritage in America, when he discusses the Negro Spiritual, Blues, and Calypso.

But Mr. Jahn's definition of "Neo-African literature" as the heir of African and Western traditions raises serious problems. For instance, a work which reveals no African stylistic features or patterns of expression belongs, according to Mr. Jahn, not to Neo-African but to Western literature, *even if written by an African*. This may sound fair enough; but *who* is to decide what constitutes African stylistic features or patterns of expression, and hence what writing is properly to be regarded as Neo-African?

Although one of the purposes of this book is to make a provisional classification of the material according to its content, Mr. Jahn can hardly be recommended as a reliable guide, since he enters upon the task with preconceived ideas. Several years ago he published in a volume entitled *Muntu* his conclusions on the poetry of negritude, which he seems to equate with genuine African writing. Unfortunately, he is still flogging the dead horse of negritude, despite the fact that many African

writers have always rejected the validity of the concept, which undoubtedly had more relevance for the French-speaking African states and which now appears to have lost its original impetus even there. Indeed, Mr. Jahn not only gives a one-sided account of the objections to the concept but, whilst allowing Nigerians certain different attitudes and stylistic features, insists that they are, nevertheless, the "legitimate heirs of negritude," whether they like it or not! It is noticeable that he is a great deal more at home with the French-speaking than with the English-speaking writers. Since there have been some quite remarkable developments in the English-speaking parts of Africa during the last ten years or so, it is to be hoped that Mr. Jahn will revise his outdated ideas and open his mind to what has actually been happening before he tackles his next volume, in which he proposes to deal with the work of African writers who have become known since 1950.

HOWARD SERGEANT

Green Islands in the Sea. By B. L. CHAK. (Publications Division, Ministry of Information and Broadcasting, Government of India. 83 pp. Illustrated. 1967. Rs. 2.75)

As Chief Commissioner of the Andaman and Nicobar Islands, Shri Chak had considerable opportunity to go round these islands and in this book, which originated from his years there, he combines an official eye for detail with a love of nature. Shri Chak describes life on the island, appreciating its good points and not slurring over the lack of amenities — due in considerable measure to insufficient contact with the mainland, only two ships plying between them regularly — which discourages people from accepting posts on the islands.

Within these pages we find a quite comprehensive picture of the islands, their climate, their scenic and practical qualities, their fauna and flora, their history and some account of the peoples who live there, both aboriginal survivors and later settlers. There are a few photographic reproductions to add interest.

Chapter 5 gives a history of the islands as a penal settlement, and describes the routine of the cellular jails from available records. Though a settlement was founded in the Andamans as early as 1789 it did not become a penal settlement until March 1858, till after the political struggle of 1857 necessitated the incarceration of numbers of political prisoners. Except for the short period of Japanese occupation, of which Shri Chak gives a brief account, the Andamans remained a penal settlement until 1946. Today the dreaded cellular jail is being gradually demolished and more of the islands are being opened for settlement of refugees, another batch of whom left only a month or two ago from West Bengal.

Much of the book is a kind of diary of the author's visits to different islands in the group. A few maps to indicate the position of various islands would have been very welcome. The appendices give statistics and facts concisely. *Green Islands in the Sea* is a useful little book and quite interesting as well.

I. MONANI

Nandini. By B. S. NIRODY. (Publications Division, Ministry of Information and Broadcasting, Government of India. 167 pp. 1967. Rs. 4.00)

The quotation from Samuel Smiles on the half-title page sets the mood of the narrative. *Nandini* is a work of fiction with a purpose. Through the lives

of Sajjan the schoolmaster and his large family, particularly the girl Nandini, we are shown that it is necessary to work hard, to be "occupied with the highest employment" of which one is capable, to achieve both satisfaction and reward. Further, we are shown the changes that are taking place in our country in education, agriculture, social consciousness, etc., again as these changes affect the lives of the characters in the novel.

Nandini is marked by a tone of determined optimism and a will to see the better side of things. All the main characters in the novel work hard and conscientiously, are helped by other good people, and get their proper reward. One has no fault to find with such commendable industry and its logical consequences. What one does feel, however, is that *Nandini* fails as a good novel: it lacks the vitality of genuinely good writing. Also the plot is contrived to bring in much that would normally have a place only in informational brochures to publicize small-scale industries, fruit-growing, and so on.

One cannot say that the information offered is not correct, or that the events depicted are not realistic. But one cannot help comparing it to the realism of much present-day Soviet writing with its concern for co-operative farming and factory outputs. Here too there is no transmutation of the events of day-to-day life to give it a deeper meaning and significance.

One is glad, however, to see our writers turning to the potential wealth of subject-matter that contemporary times and developments in the country provide. A conscious appraisal by our intelligentsia, particularly our writers, can do much to shape events, to check and guide.

I. MONANI

Ends and Sayings

"... ends of verse
And sayings of philosophers."

—SAMUEL BUTLER: *Hudibras*

Allen Skinner, in his *Peace News* feature, "Personal Comment" (10 January 1969), deals with the present trend that he calls "The Flight from Reason."

The legacy left by two World Wars includes not only the "terrible development in the willingness and capacity of human beings to inflict torture on other human beings," but also the present cult of the irrational. Our reason can recognize the tragic absurdity of certain aspects of life, but this, he writes, is not the same thing as the acceptance of the dominance of the Absurd at the expense of Reason. Examples are found in the plays of Beckett, Ionesco, and Jarry; the latter's *Roi Ubu* is an unpleasant, scatological piece of work which, though it embodies aspects of valid satire on society, largely represents the flight from Reason which has come later to characterize Surrealism, where hallucination and the glorification of the subconscious is equally presented as a basis for living.

He considers that this glorification of the subconscious (which Freud's ideas have encouraged), and which shows in particularly unpleasant art-forms, has produced much of the fashionable "psychedelic" trends, as well as destructive, anti-social, "lunatic" behaviour. Intuitive perception, he declares, is valuable when "harnessed to, and guided by rational thought," but

will lead to tragedy if it is taken to be "independent of, and superior to, the rational faculty."

Here, it would seem, Mr. Skinner has not clarified his definitions. There is a great distinction between *real intuition* which *is* above ordinary reason, and that almost mediumistic sub-rationality of the unconscious, which, if allowed to become dominant, does betray man's birthright of reason, and drag him down.

The Eastern classification of man's constitution gives help here. *Manas* is the principle of reason and self-consciousness; *Buddhi,* the faculty of intuition, leaps to truth without having to weigh the pros and cons. It is spiritual discrimination, as also "the wisdom of the heart" (N.B., not the fluctuating emotions); *Kama* is the emotional, animal, irrational centre in man. It is that which is mostly denoted by the term "subconscious."

Rationality alone becomes sterile (or one-eyed, as Whitehead called the eighteenth-century "Reason"). Hence the revolt against it. These revolts can be traced periodically throughout history. But *Manas* must link itself either with *Buddhi* or with *Kama,* leading either to "life" or to "death." Hence an age of "irrationality" will include both the sub-rationality that Mr. Skinner so rightly denounces, and also — though far less spectacularly — aspirations towards the higher, super-rational Wisdom. It would be of value to search today for the signs of this Wisdom.

The enterprising quarterly *World Studies Education Service,* following its practice of linking with other movements working along related lines, has, with its Number 10, presented subscribers with a specimen issue of the twice-yearly *Bulletin of the General Studies Association.* Incidentally, the Editor of the latter, Ian Lister, described something of the Association's purpose in THE ARYAN PATH, October 1964 ("Towards a World Outlook in English Education"). The present issue concentrates on political education, which constitutes "a problem area of the curriculum." The Editorial emphasizes that this does not mean "partisan indoctrination," but "touches upon the very roots of society and the whole structure of the educational system." Five contributors from universities and colleges of education, in Britain, Germany, and U.S.A., present their viewpoints. A collection of sixth-form "howlers" about the meaning of common terms, such as "feudal," "communism," capitalism," "civil service," "imperialism," and "diplomacy," indicates the need for such education.

World Studies itself, under the editorship of Dr. F. L. Henderson, continues its fruitful gathering of reports of work done and suggestions made, in the different educational fields. It announces the recently founded Academy of World Studies at San Francisco. The traditional "periscopic" view separates the branches of knowledge. The Academy proposes a "synoptic" approach, synthesizing the treatment of the whole world and mankind. It sees "today" as "a razor-edge in time," separating the unchangeable past from the future which each one of us can influence. The separative viewpoint has led to strife, insecurity, anarchy.

> Perspective, relativity and interdependence are the key concepts in the Academy's approach to education ... Mankind's legacy of knowledge indicates that individuals, not "nations" should be our major unit of concern in building for tomorrow.

Indeed, the perennial need is that of self-responsibility within the shared order.

An important survey of "Vegetarianism and the World Food Problem," by Jack Lucas, appeared in *The British Vegetarian,* January-February 1969. It noted the significance of the welcome

given by Lord Boyd Orr (first Director-General of F.A.O.) and the present Director-General, Dr. Boerma, to a new magazine, *Plant Food for Human Nutrition*. It is the opinion of many knowledgeable vegetarians that economic factors and the food problems of the developing countries will play a large part in the general acceptance of the value of a vegetarian diet, since it makes the best possible use of available land resources. Protein is essential for health, but

> animal conversion of plant proteins into animal produce is a wasteful and inefficient process ... animal protein is more expensive than plant protein and quite uneconomic for the poorer developing nations.

Encouraging signs are seen in the development of high-yielding varieties of cereals, from which India and Pakistan have benefited. The reduction of wastage is another important target, i.e., the protection of crops against depredations by pests, and by virus and fungi infections, and the elimination of damage and loss due to faulty storage. The development of food technology — the cultivation of micro-organisms and the utilization of green leaves as sources of protein — offers hopeful prospects. The survey ends:

> In this and other ways we can render a service to mankind with the knowledge and satisfaction that it is also based on a non-violent approach and a compassionate responsibility to animals.

The same issue also reports a lecture given to vegetarian research groups at Queen Elizabeth College, London, by Dr. Rajalakshmi of the M.S. University, Baroda, India, in which she described the valuable, practical nutritional research made at a backward village in Gujarat, to counteract dietary deficiencies.

Under the title "The Man Who Couldn't Forget" the *Sunday Times* (19 January 1969) published extracts from a book published shortly afterwards — *The Mind of a Mnemonist* by Dr. A. R. Luria, Professor of Psychology, Moscow University. For thirty years Dr. Luria tested the phenomenal memory of a man he calls "S." The latter had the power of total recall, and could reproduce, in normal or reverse order, lengthy series of numbers, words, or even gibberish, and repeat them accurately even seventeen years later.

The procedures S. found necessary afford significant evidence for the theory of the existence of "the astral light," a subtle invisible substance interpenetrating our atmosphere, which carries the records of all events, and affords an explanation of clairvoyance, prophecy, and such like. S. *saw* his series, or else converted the elements into *visual images*, which he then *read* at will. He also possessed a high degree of *synesthesia* — sound was seen as light, colour, form, and also tasted and smelt (phenomena associated too with the astral plane). As a framework for a long series of images, S. distributed these along a mentally-imaged street, to "fix" them, developing a kind of mnemonic shorthand to save energy. His problems were how to erase, or forget, memories not needed, and how to distinguish between objective and subjective vision. One could, with profit, compare his techniques with those described by Frances A. Yates in *The Art of Memory* (1966) on the Hermetic tradition dealing with memory, imagination, and magic, with special reference to Giordano Bruno.

ERRATUM

We regret that in "Reflections on the New Year" (THE ARYAN PATH, January 1969), on p. 3, in paragraph 2, line 2, "Jesus" has been misprinted by oversight instead of "Janus."

Statement about ownership and other particulars about the magazine "THE ARYAN PATH" to be published in the first issue every year after the last day of February

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FORM IV

(See Rule 8)

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I, L. S. Doraiswamy, hereby declare that the particulars given above are true to the best of my knowledge and belief.

(*Sd.*) L. S. DORAISWAMY
Publisher

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